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PHILO ON IMMORTALITY

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THE WRITINGS of mystics always seem nonsense to the non-mystical, and apparently nothing will ever explain the one to the other. The chief difficulty is, perhaps, the freedom with which the mystic contradicts himself, and this he does largely for three reasons. First, the mystic despairs of language as an expression of his ideas, and often treats words and figures of speech loosely just because they mean little to him themselves, since he apprehends most completely in silence. Yet sometimes, in the second place, the inconsistency is studied, and the mystic is trying to suggest an a-verbal idea, doing so by a process which may be compared to the "resultant" of stresses in physics: for by two pulls at an angle to each other one may move an object between them in a direction different from either pull. Or, the same figure, one may make a wind blow a sail-boat in a path directly against itself by going off on a sufficient number of mutually correcting tacks. In the same way the mystic often feels that one of the best devices he can use to express himself is to build up verbal inconsistencies. So he declares that he goes to glory through humiliation, loses himself in order to find himself, dies in order to live, and in these statements creates an impression different from the literal meaning of any single word he uses. In art he similarly makes a monogram of cross and crown. Perhaps beneath such paradoxes is that dark pattern of motivation within us which Freud called the double "urge" in man, the urge to life and the urge to death, and the mystic experience is the reconciliation of these. If that is the case, and as a figurative statement the idea has much to commend it, the mystic may often contradict himself in order to express each side of the antithesis, to describe in one or another figure each of these "urges," and in the very

statement of the antithesis to suggest to someone who is like him the character of the resolution.

Or, thirdly, the mystic may contradict himself because on different occasions he is speaking from and to different levels of experience and comprehension. For mysticism is at least three dimensional, and the mystic may deliberately say something to one audience which he would flatly contradict for another.

A given contradiction may arise in a mystic's writings from one of these reasons, or from all three simultaneously. In any case it always must be assumed that, if the mystic cannot say outright in plain words what he means, it is presumptuous for a commentator to do it for him. The mystics assure us that we see only the reverse side of their thinking when we study their words: that behind their confusion is a brilliant obverse which utterly defies verbal precision, their own or any one's else.

Philo Judaeus is an excellent example of such a writer. His pages are literally often the sheerest nonsense,[1] yet they betray a spirit of direct and deep conviction which could come only from a sense of definite reality. There is only one way to treat such writings if we would understand the writer: we must take all he has to say on a given subject, study the whole as best we can with these incentives to mystical contradiction in mind, and then ultimately try to arrive at the author's goal with him, which we usually do, if at all, not by discarding one or the other elements in a given contradiction, but by going now with one, now the other, until our minds too come to the resultant reality in his mind between them.

Briefly I propose to do this here with Philo's remarks upon immortality, with the double purpose of depicting an instance of mystic-thinking, and of finding perhaps some suggestion which can be used elsewhere as to what may have been in the minds of the Jews who adopted for their graves and synagogues the pagan symbols of life after death. To jump from Philo at once to the Jewish catacombs of Rome or North Africa I do not suggest for a moment, but what a Jew of Philo's prominence was himself thinking on the subject, and what he seems to reflect of the thinking of other Jews, it is most important clearly to understand.

[1]See below n. 68.

Many of Philo's allusions to death and its consequences are quite casual or conventional, and are so foreign to his usual ways of thinking that we at once suspect them. As a matter of fact he reflects from his environment almost every important attitude toward death except the flippancy which seems to us in such bad taste for some Roman epitaphs. "I was not: I was; I am not: I do not care." "What I have eaten and what I have drunk, that is all that belongs to me." [2] Philo never lapses into such expression, but not because the idea was unknown to him; it was the spirit of levity which was more alien than the conception. Philo is one of the most uniformly serious writers to be found anywhere, and his humor would not begin with jests about death. With the flippancy removed, however, Philo several times seems to express himself about death in almost exactly this Epicurean way. He says that "man's nature is perishable," [3] and that immortality and incorruption are quite impossible for men.[4] He even says that banishment is a worse penalty than death since death ends all pain but that in banishment men still have their faculties and so they can suffer a thousand deaths.[5] This reflects a cliché from lawyers' talk about penalties; it certainly did not originate with Philo, or express his usual thoughts about death.[6] But it does let us see Philo with, at one level, a very normal attitude toward death. For there are few men who at times are not engrossed with a sense of the inevitability and finality of death

[2] F. Cumont, After Life in Roman Paganism, 1922, 9–12, quotes these two and many others of the sort.

[3] Abr. 55: *ἀνθρώπων φθαρτὴ φύσις*. Philo's works are here abbreviated according to the scheme in my By Light, Light, 1935, pp. xiii f.

[4] Mut. 210: *ἀθανασίαν καὶ ἀφθαρσίαν εὐχόμενος, ἀνθρώπῳ πρᾶγμα ἀδύνατον*.

[5] Philo says this twice, Abr. 64 and 230. He contradicts it in the same treatise, 258 f., where he says that at death the soul returns to God.

[6] Suetonius, Divus Julius 14, reports how Caesar insisted that exile rather than death should be the punishment of Catiline and his followers. Cicero, In Catil. IV, iv, 7, 8, gives as the reason that Caesar "felt that death was appointed by the immortal gods not for the sake of punishment, but rather as a necessity of nature, or as a release from toils and wretchedness. Therefore wise men have never met it unwillingly, and the brave have often met it with joy. But imprisonment, especially perpetual imprisonment, was invented certainly for the special punishment of nefarious wickedness. . . . He would leave only life to nefarious men. If he took that away he would have relieved them at a single stroke of many sorrows of soul and body, and of all the punishment of their crimes." Cicero goes on to say that it was to prevent exactly this that the ancients devised punishment in the next world, since otherwise death would seem a light punishment. My colleague Mr. Bellinger kindly recalled this Catilinian parallel to me.

to the exclusion of all sense of after-life. Philo was not such an ecstatic believer in life after death that he could not occasionally slip into this sort of attitude and expression.

Just as little, however, do I feel that Philo meant literally, or with any finality, statements exactly to the contrary, where he speaks in conventional terms about "the eternal banishment" (ἡ ἀίδιος φυγή) of the wicked. For example he says:

> One who is weighed down in helpless subjection to the severe and incurable illness (of sin) must bear undying horrors to all eternity; he is thrust out of the place of the impious, there to endure misery unmitigated and unrelieved.[7]

Men think, he says specifically, that death is the end of punishment, but in the divine court it is hardly the beginning.[8] The wise and good are destined to dwell in the heavenly Olympus, but the wicked are bound for the endless death of Hades.[9] There is an ascent in which the holy soul is deified, lifted above the universe to the place beyond, which is really not place but God (*non locus sed deus*); but the wicked who attempt this flight are soon thrust down into Tartarus.[10]

Philo is, then, able to talk in terms of what we call hell, and see no reason why many Jews in Alexandria and elsewhere may not have believed in a literal hell, just as the Synoptic tradition would lead us to suppose that Jesus did. Jewish apocalyptists show clearly that Jews did think vividly in such terms. Philo also can use this language, and again it is important that he can do so. But if we know from IV Maccabees that even some hellenized Jews did believe in a very literal heaven and hell, they had apparently for Philo only figurative, or, as he specifically says, "mythological," value. God roots the proper mind, he explains, in immortality and eternity, but the wicked he banishes to the farthest remove from himself, to the place of pleasures, desires, and crimes. This place is most properly called "the place of the wicked," he adds; it is "not given the mythological name Hades

[7] Cherub. 2; cf. 78.
[8] Praem. 69.
[9] Som. i, 151 f.; cf. Heres 78.
[10] QE ii, 40.

for the term "Hades" represents the sort of life a bad man lives.[11] That is, as "place" has only figurative meaning when applied to God in Philo's thought, so banishment from God cannot be a spacial removal. What he means is that there can be no spacial banishment from a non-spacial entity. Similarly there can be no spacial banishment from a non-spacial God, and "Hades," the "place" of that banishment, cannot be spacial: it is a state of ungodliness, of isolation from the divine quality of being, and in that its punishment is automatic. Many modern churchmen have come to use the same reasoning about hell, and to conclude, as Philo tells us he and his friends had concluded, that undying life (ἡ ἀθάνατος ζωή) and eternal death (ὁ ἀίδιος θάνατος) await, respectively, the good and the bad,[12] without attempting to make their thoughts more precise, especially about the fate of the wicked. But if the "inexorable penalty" [13] of the wicked does not imply in Philo's mind a literal Hades, he and his group could use the Greek terms for it, and apparently thought it none the less real because he regarded the physical descriptions as figures. To die in wickedness was to him a horrible fate.

I must take in the same indirect sense other statements of Philo which are in form as Stoic as the foregoing are popularly Epicurean or mythological. For Philo says a few times that the soul of man is material, made up of the "fifth substance," the aether, as his body is made up of the four elements. This aether is superior to the other material elements especially in the fact that its natural motion is circular, that the heaven is made up of it, and that it reveals itself as the stars. Of this Philo said that the soul of man is a fragment, an ἀπόσπασμα.[14] At death, just as the body is dissolved into the four elements, the soul fragment returns to the aether "as to its father." [15] In another treatise it would seem that the whole soul is not thus made of aether but only

[11] Congr. 56f.

[12] Posterit. 39.

[13] Immut. 48.

[14] Opif. 146; LA iii, 161; Det. 90; Mut. 223. This is sometimes soul, sometimes mind, etc. According to Josephus, BJ II, 154, the Essenes likewise thought that souls were made out of the aether.

[15] Heres 282f. Cf. QG iv, 111, where a rhetorical question is asked: *utrum datur nobis locus vel spatium apud patrem tuum in aethere caeloque atque magis superius apud rectorem istorum verbum divinum.*

the "mind," [16] by which presumably he means that higher mind within the soul we shall soon describe.

Colson connects Philo's remarks about the aether with Aristotle because the fifth element in both Philo and Aristotle moves in a circle.[17] But it seems more natural to me to suppose that Philo took the whole conception from the Stoics since the whole is found only with them for when Philo says that the soul is, as aether, of a category *νοερὸν καὶ οὐράνιον*, "intelligent and heavenly," he is using a phraseology common to Stoics from Zeno on. To them the heaven is the ultimate aether, borne, as with Aristotle, in a circle about the world; as such, Zeno explained, it is the creative fiery element which is utterly different from ordinary destructive fire, and it is so intelligent that even the moon, as consisting of it, is intelligent.[18] What in Philo is as completely Stoic as it is foreign to Aristotle is the notion that the human soul also consists of this aether, and that as such it is a foreign presence in a body otherwise constituted so that man as a whole is made up of two parts, soul and body, each with its own nature and destiny. The very term *ἀπόσπασμα* for the soul as a fragment of the universal soul seems originally Stoic.[19] Aristotle, on the contrary, expressed in a variety of ways the notion that the soul is the entelechy or the form of the body, separable from the body only logically.[20] The term "fifth substance" itself seems to be one that strict Stoics avoided for the aether,[21] and by them the soul itself is more apt to be called the *πνεῦμα* or *λόγος* than aether, and the ultimate substance the *πνεῦμα* or the *πῦρ τεχνικόν*. But the general idea of these passages, that of a fiery stuff which

[16] Immut. 46.

[17] See his notes at III, 485; IV, 575.

[18] Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. I, nos. 115, 116, 120. Cf. Chrysippus ap. ibid. II 527.

[19] The Stoics used the word, if we may believe Eusebius and others, from Zeno o (von Arnim, op. cit., I, 36); Diog. La. VII, 143, ascribes it to Chrysippus and other

[20] Ed. Zeller's account of this still seems to me the clearest and best: Philosophie d Griechen, II, ii, 479 f., especially the long footnote 4 on pp. 483–486 (Eng. Tran Aristotle II, 1 ff., the footnote 2 beginning on p. 6). He shows in this note that in very few passages Aristotle comes near to calling aether the substance of the soul, bu does not do so because the conception is quite foreign to his usual thinking.

[21] Zeller seems to me definitely wrong when he quotes Origen as saying that th Stoics denied the fifth element altogether, with reference to Contra Celsum iv, 5 (Philos. der Gr. III, i, 189, n. 4; Engl. Tr., Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics 201, n. 5 Origen appears rather to say that the Stoics denied that aether is immaterial. Cice does say that the Stoics denied a fifth element, and it may be that they did not lik this term: but they certainly taught the fact.

flows about the universe and then appears in fragments in men as their souls, is quite Stoic.

Philo, however, can hardly have meant any of this literally. Indeed in another passage he directly contradicts the Stoic connection of the soul with aether:

> The soul is deified by its ascent not into the air or the aether, or into the highest of all the heavens, but beyond all heavens: and beyond the universe is not space [or, position] but God.[22]

Indeed this statement not only contradicts Stoicism but brings us much closer to his own position. He could use the Stoic figure that the soul is a spark of divine fire or aether because he believed so definitely with Plato, the Pythagoreans, Orphics, and others, that the soul of man is something utterly different from his material body, come down to dwell or be imprisoned in the body from some heavenly state. His conception of this is by no means consistently elaborated, and indeed his using its Stoic counterpart is only an extreme instance of his wide variety of figures for the notion.

The conception itself, which might be called the fundamental one of Greek mysticism, was probably introduced to the Greeks by Dionysiacs. It seems originally to have arisen from a primitive sense of the contrast between soul and body, the visible and invisible. Whatever the people who held to this point of view may have considered the actual nature of the soul (and there seems no reason to believe that they had any single or specific theory) they were united in believing that it was somehow imprisoned in the body, where it struggles, by rites and enthusiasm, and ultimately by a properly safeguarded death, to escape and return to deity, or to the god's presence, or simply to its "source" however conceived. The Stoics held this basic doctrine of the soul in what was probably its popular and primitive form in so far as they presented it in wholly material terms. But the contrast between a coarser material of the body and a finer type for the soul had seemed quite inade-

[22] QE ii, 40. Translating Aucher's Latin. In QG iii, 11, Philo says that Abraham's departure to his "fathers" is "*according to the opinion of many commentators*," the return to "all the elements into which the mortal man when he dies is resolved." Philo does not like this, makes it the return to the incorporeal substance (in Platonic sense), or to the angels (in popular Jewish terms). The point disputed seems not the allegorization of the verse but the doctrine of future life implied in each allegorization. There are abundant other traces in Philo that other Jews were much more Stoic than he.

quate to Plato and his followers, and it was probably he who first changed the tension of soul against body into a tension of the material against the immaterial. It is with the doctrine in this form that we shall find Philo at last completely at home. But meanwhile he will use freely more primitive formulations, just as we have already seen that he used the Stoic formulation, according, it would seem, as one or the other best suits his immediate needs in allegorizing a given text of Scripture.

One of these is a doctrine found also in Plato, that the air is full of demigods or demons whose function it is to be mediators between the divine and human, explaining and representing each to the other.[23] These demons get entangled in matter, on occasion, and so become the souls in human beings. This seems to have been before Plato a popular notion which made Socrates' references to his *daimonion* intelligible to his contemporaries.[24] The conception was by Xenocrates especially made to occupy a very important place in Platonic tradition, and according to Heinze the doctrine went from Xenocrates to Posidonius and the Stoics, and thence to Philo, after which it was widely accepted by Neopythagoreans and Neo-Platonists.

Heinze's idea that Philo's use of the conception stems from Posidonius need not draw us into a digression. Like so many of the students of the period Heinze constructs Posidonius largely out of Philo and Seneca, and then concludes a great dependence of both upon Posidonius. The method seems to me not unimpeachable. In this case I do not see why Philo could not have learned all he says from Plato, the Platonic tradition in general, and the Neopythagoreans, though actually nothing precludes his having got it from the Stoics or Posidonius himself. In the great gaps of our knowl-

[23] Symposium 202E; quoted by Colson, II, 502.

[24] R. Heinze, Xenocrates 78–123, has the best history of this notion, and on p. 92 he concludes about Plato just the opposite of the above. He says that Plato invented the demons as mediators between gods and men, and deliberately misrepresented them as having long popularly functioned in that capacity. I find Heinze's arguments throughout as artificial as his material is valuable. References to the demons by writers before Plato show clearly that they did not sharply distinguish the two, and that often, as with Thales, the gods and demons were completely synonymous. But this by no means precludes a popular tendency to make the demons the divine forces in the air, in the half-formed animistic sense which they manifest in all the later material Heinze cites, including material from Philo himself. See also Nilsson in Harvard Theological Review XXXVI (1943), 263f.

edge of hellenistic philosophy we draw lines between isolated points of information with far too great confidence.

Be that as it may, for our purpose here it is notable that Philo brings in the doctrine never for its direct bearing upon the problem of man's immortality, but as a way of giving a place in Greek thought to the angels of the Old Testament. He has these to allegorize especially in the biblical "angels of God" who took wives from the daughters of men,[25] the angels of Jacob's ladder,[26] or the divine company implied in the expression "Let us make," [27] while he introduces the conception also into his tremendous allegory of the Logos as the Cosmic Vine or Tree of Life: the Vine has living representatives or branches in every part of the universe, and it is the angels-demons who are the branches in the air.[28] To him the terms "souls," "demons," and "angels" are, at least for this allegory, definitely synonymous.[29] They are the living creatures in the air in the sense that the sea is inhabited with marine life, and some of the demons become incarnate in bodies. Those not incarnate are the ministers and attendants of God whom we more usually associate with the term angel. Those caught in the stream of matter are most of them engulfed, to the point that they cannot even look up to the heavens.[30] Such a soul is carried along by the body as though in the flood of a river.[31] But a few of them by careful study of philosophy practise death with respect to the body that thereby they may get a share of incorporeal and immortal life, in the presence of the One who is himself without beginning or end. It need hardly be labored that here Philo is talking the language of Plato's Phaedo,[32] but is giving the conception a Jewish cast of theism by

[25] Gig. 6–31.

[26] Som. i, 133–152.

[27] Conf. 174–177; the argument properly begins at § 168.

[28] Plant. 1–27, esp. 14. Heinze considers these on his pages 112f. In other statements of Philo the angels are unbodied souls: Sacr. 5, Spec. i, 66; they function as God's emissaries to men in Som. i, 190, Conf. 181; the theory of angels-demons clearly lies behind casual references in Abr. 113, 115, LA iii, 177, 178, Virt. 74. Other explanations appear when the angels are "rays" of God, Som. i, 115; theophanies of God, Som. i, 232, 238; representations of the Logos, Sobr. 65.

[29] Gig. 16: *ψυχὰς καὶ δαίμονας καὶ ἀγγέλους ὀνόματα μὲν διαφέροντα, ἓν δὲ καὶ ταὐτὸν ὑποκείμενον.*

[30] Gig. 13–15, 31.

[31] Gig. 13; Som. i, 147. Colson notes that this echoes Plato's Timaeus 43A.

[32] Colson notes the Platonic parallels: Phaedo 64A, 67E; and even Heinze sees the influence of the Phaedrus in the souls which become incarnate.

introducing the God in whose presence the ambition of the philosophic mystic is satisfied. In continuing the figure in one discussion [33] Philo points out that God's spirit could not abide among men always because they were flesh, and this is again for Philo the basic contrast between those who, thoroughly incarnate, can have only fleeting touches of God's spirit, as over against those who seem even during incarnation to be really free from flesh and body, so that they live steadily even here in the divine presence. At the end of another of these discussions [34] Philo says of these "souls" that it is the portion of the wise ones to remain in Olympus, while the bad end up in Hades, since they have concerned themselves from cradle to grave with dying, that is, we infer, with matter and its concerns. In between these are the "practisers," the *ἀσκηταί*, who are doing the best they can and seem going now up, now down, the great ladder. God finally settles the strife by dividing the bad in them from the good, by which we infer again that God separates the body from the soul or mind; he rewards the one while he sends the other to perdition. To this conception of division at death we shall return. At this point all we can say is that the idea of "demons-souls-angels" has provided Philo with another figure for what is beginning to emerge as his central thought, the notion of the incarnation of a spiritual unit, if I may call it that, in the bodily constitution, and its release at death to return to its source.

Another figurative approach to the same idea is found in Philo's allegories of the "breath" which God breathed into man's nostrils at creation. In his most important comment upon this [35] Philo clearly does not wish to represent the incident as the Orphic fall of the soul into matter, for this would make the breath of God fall. fall by deliberate act of God himself. So Philo interprets the incident in such a way that the man made of clay is not the physical body but the lower mind (to which we shall return).[36] To this lower and bodily mind the spirit or breath of God was added in the act of creation, the spirit which gives man a share in "true life." This combination it is which can be called a "living soul." Philo

[33] Gig. 19–31, commenting upon Gen. vi, 3.
[34] Som. i, 151, 152.
[35] LA i, 31–42.
[36] In § 32 he says that this mind is *γεώδης τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός*, in § 33 that it i *γηγενῆς καὶ φιλοσώματος*.

does not here elaborate, but actually he has implied that man has three aspects to his constitution, his body, his bodily mind, and a divine "spirit" by means of which alone man can hope to conceive of divinity. Still he is presenting the same basic picture, that of a body, or of a body with a bodily mind, to which a divine principle is added in the form of God's breath. What is really here, then, is another figure for the Orphic dualism of matter and divinity within man himself.

The "spirit" element Philo sometimes calls the soul of the soul, but still more often the dominant mind. In allegorizing "the soul of every flesh is the blood" (Lev. xvii, 11) he says[37] that "soul" is used in two senses, for the whole soul or for "its dominant part,[38] which properly speaking is the soul of the soul," just as the "eye" may be the whole organ or only that part of it by which we actually see. This "dominant part," he says, is the divine spirit, clearly again the spirit breathed in at creation. There can be no doubt that it is the same higher part of the soul which in another passage[39] Philo calls the ruler (ἡγεμών) of the soul, or even its god, but which is now not spirit but mind; and this mind, like the spirit of the former passages, has the power to soar through the cosmic spheres and, in the language of the Phaedrus, to surpass even the world of Forms and to come to God in an intoxication superior to that of the Corybantes, Philo says, there to be engulfed in the dazzling brilliance of the divine radiance.

The spirit which was cognitive, or the "mind" which was spirit, Philo much preferred to call by the Greek "mind" rather than the biblical "spirit," presumably, I should guess, because πνεῦμα had the Stoic aura of materialism, while "mind" had been made by Plato the vehicle, if not the representation, of the immaterial. The concept in Philo was in any case a Greek one superimposed upon the biblical terms.

For it was in the Greek tradition, especially since Aristotle, to assume that each man has two minds. One of these was a mind which corresponded quite largely to the "stimulus-response" mind

[37] Heres 55.

[38] τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν αὐτῆς μέρος, an obvious echo of Stoicism again. For mind as the ἡγεμονικόν in greater Stoic detail see Agr. 29f.

[39] Opif. 69–71. Coomaraswamy called my attention to the similarities of this passage, especially in the description of the mystic height, with Phaedrus 247B.

of contemporary terminology. It was a constituent of the bodily constitution with the power to coördinate sense impressions, to choose pleasure rather than pain, but its whole concern, indeed its very constitution, was material and bodily. It was Paul's "mind of the flesh" in contrast to the "mind of the spirit," [40] since in addition to the fleshly or lower mind man was thought to have a higher mind. The survival today of the higher mind is our popular "conscience," since conscience is colloquially an immediate presence of God within us, or a spiritual organ of some sort with power to perceive and recognize the right, quite apart from the operation or ideas of our ordinary minds. This organ, still in the popular colloquial sense, ideally rules our actions: "Let your conscience be your guide." It was much such a spiritual organ of which Philo repeatedly speaks when he talks of the "mind" or "spirit" which should ideally dominate or guide the rest of the soul, and through the soul the body. With Philo the function of the organ was not, as with our conscience, merely to form immediate moral judgments: rather it perceived reality in the full Platonic sense, perceived such basic concepts as the One, Equality, and the like, from which Platonic tradition tried always to derive its specific ethical applications. It is, says Philo, the eye or vision of the soul, illumined by beams of a peculiar character, and made up of a substance not at all like the material elements of the rest of our constitution. It consists (and here Philo is again approaching Stoic language) of the substance of which the stars are made.[41]

Often as Philo refers to the "soul" as the prisoner in the body in the Orphic-Platonic sense, it is strictly this higher mind which he means. For to the extent that any animal can coördinate its sensuous experiences and form from them a pattern of behavior, of preferences and abhorrences, that animal must be said to have a mind, the same lower mind in a less developed form than man's.

[40] In Spec. iv, 123, blood is the *οὐσία* of the soul, not of the *νοερά* and *λογική* soul, but of the *αἰσθητική*, that is, the soul which gives such life as we have in common with the animals. Philo is on good Hebraic grounds (Gen. ix, 4, 5) in identifying the blood with the life, or soul, whether in man or beast, but he could have quoted Empedocles for the same (widely held) identification: E. Rohde, Psyche (English Transl.), 1925, 380; cf. 402, n. 68.

[41] Immut. 46. Colson notes that this is the aether, but that carries Philo's figures farther than Philo does himself. I am not sure that Philo did not mean here the *πνεῦμα* in the sense of the "spirit" of Genesis rather than in any Stoic sense.

The higher qualities of man which distinguish him from the other animals seem in this tradition to center essentially in an element which is added to the lower mind, a higher mind which becomes the divine prisoner in the body. Philo says this specifically in one passage[42] when he describes the ultimate combination as a city made up of all the elements of body and soul as distinct citizens. Out of this confinement the higher mind constantly tries to escape to contemplate the incorporeal ideas and God.[43] It is with this correction that we should read all the passages of Philo where he more loosely speaks of the "soul" as being confined to the prison, the tomb, of the body,[44] or where, in terms which alone make Paul's seventh chapter of Romans intelligible, he speaks of the body as a corpse to which we are bound, and of ourselves as "corpse-bearers":

> The body is wicked and a plotter against the soul, and is always a corpse and a dead thing. For you must understand that each of us does nothing but carry a corpse about, since the soul lifts up and bears without effort the body which is in itself a corpse.[45]

Philo has in this connection the same confusion of figures as Paul, for with both of them the body is simultaneously a corpse tied to the soul, and an active schemer for the soul's destruction. The mystic will have no difficulty with this paradox. At one time the dead dull weight of material entanglement can be expressed only by the figure of the corpse, stinking and dead, which the soul must carry; at other times the desires of the body are extremely active in bringing the soul itself to death. So the mystic calls the body both a corpse and a schemer against him. This true relation of soul and body, Philo says, the mind perceives only when it is being elevated from out the body, and gets what we should call some perspective on the situation, by being initiated into the Mysteries of the Lord.[46] Confusion is increased for those who expect the impossible, consistency, from such a mystic thinker as Philo when he says that the soul or mind must kill the corpse-body to get its freedom.[47]

Even more extensively is the conception elaborated in another

[42] Ebr. 99–103.
[43] Ibid.
[44] LA i, 107, 108; cf. QG iv, 152.
[45] LA iii, 69; cf. 72, 74.
[46] Ibid. 71: *τὰ τοῦ κυρίου μυστηρία μυῆται.*
[47] Ibid. 74: *θάνατον καταψηφίζεται τοῦ νεκροῦ σώματος*, literally to condemn it to death.

treatise, that on the Migration of Abraham, where Philo allegorizes the departure of Abraham from his father's house at the command of God. He explains that this narrative represents the release of the soul (§ 2) or mind (§§ 3, 4) from the body, from sense perception, and from speech (λόγος ὁ κατὰ προφοράν) as the soul or mind comes to perceive God and the true Logos (§§ 1–12). This mind [48] is assumed to be the indwelling divine fragment we are meeting in so many forms, and it is our "father" (§ 3) in the Stoic sense that from it go out all the powers of sense perception and speech to the various parts of the body. But in doing this the mind has "made a loan of itself to each sense" (§ 10), a process by which it loses its identity. This is a most unusual and interesting amalgamation of Stoic figures of speech with the "Orphic." The Stoic thought that the highest in man was the reason, the ἡγεμονικόν or leading, active, principle which extended itself throughout the body as the five senses, speech, and the active part of the human sperma. Philo is accepting this conception for the time being, but is regarding it as an alternative description of how the soul, mind, or divine principle becomes lost in Orphic-Platonic fashion in the body, and he calls upon this mind to withdraw the loans of itself (τὰ σαυτοῦ δάνεια), and so to recover its full life and properties in perpetuity (εἰς ἀεί) (§ 11). The demands of the flesh are of course compared also to the demands of the Egyptian slave drivers, and for the groaning which the "intelligence with vision" (ὀρατικὴ διάνοια) makes at this oppression God has raised up Moses who will deliver it (§§ 14, 15).

The Migration of Abraham is in general concerned with such an escape conceived as a mystic experience in this life, but there follows immediately after the foregoing statements a digression of great interest based upon the story of Joseph. For here the final consummation after death is considered. Joseph was the dubious hero, rather on a level we might hope to approximate than on a par with the great patriarchs, for he went deliberately to Egypt in the first place, Egypt the symbol of the body where he now is caught, and his bones were carried out only in the general migration of the Israelites. Joseph assumes many interesting roles in Philo's allegory,[49] but here he represents one who has made only preliminary

[48] Colson capitalizes "mind" throughout this passage, but seems to me to confuse Philo's meaning in doing so.

[49] See my The Politics of Philo Judaeus, 1938, Chapters II and III.

sorties from the body, won only temporary victories over it, while he was alive, with the result that at death he was buried in Egypt, and decayed there. But his bones did not decay; they were carried from Egypt in the exodus under Moses. These bones were "the only riches which such a soul left behind that were untouched by corruption (*ἀδιάφθορα*) and worthy of surviving in memory (*ἀξιομνημόνευτα*)" (§§ 16, 17). Philo goes on to define each of these terms in such a way that they represent the familiar virtues, such as belief that God meets the mystic in his ascent, the power of discrimination between mortal and immortal values, rejection of pleasure, acuteness in distinguishing true fact from illusion as witnessed in Joseph's power to interpret dreams, mastery of the body, the appropriation for oneself of the true life, such as Joseph made when he was still in Egypt, which meant his rejection of the body he was "carrying about like a corpse." This list is quite abbreviated from Philo's, but he considered his own list to be "only a few" of the traits of one who refuses to dwell in the dead body of the flesh at all, and who follows out of it the leadership of Moses, the law-giving Logos, the Male Nurse.[50]

The last phrase represents the doublet in Philo, *τροφεὺς καὶ τιθηνός*, words which both mean properly a father or male who gives suck. Both are usually translated "foster father," but the root meaning was clearly intended in Numbers xi, 12; it was thoroughly familiar in Egyptian pictorial representation; and it received classic expression in Christianity later, when Clement of Alexandria craved to suck the breast of God:

> We take refuge at the "care soothing breast" (Iliad x, 83) of the Father, that is the Logos. And he alone, as is fitting, supplies us babes with the milk of love, (*ἀγάπη*), and those only are truly blessed who suck this breast: for to those babes who seek the Logos the Father's breasts of love (*φιλανθρωπία*) furnish milk.[51]

Accordingly, I translate literally the word in Philo's passage, where he says that it is Moses who is Logos and Nurse, and the milk is his teaching. The meaning of the passage is that Joseph represents an ordinary man who is honestly trying to save his soul (or "mind"). Such a man makes occasional sorties from the body in

[50] Migr. 17–24.
[51] Paed. I, 42, 2–43, 4; 46, 1, abbreviated.

mystical flight, but really spends his life in "Egypt," the world of bodily things. When he dies he is buried in Egypt, where everything but the "bones" decay. But in the great migration led by Moses from Egypt the bones of that man are carried out to the Promised Land. In plain terms, Joseph is saved, as we Christians would say, through the savior [Moses], who is the Logos, and who gives to man the divine milk. Through this salvation man, or at least his spiritual "mind" as represented by the bones in the story, may hope after death to return to the divine source.

Higher than Joseph were Philo's "sages," the Stoic term here as so often in Philo, used for a conception not Stoic at all. Ordinary men are "emigrants" from heaven to the world of matter; they leave heaven to settle permanently in the material world. But the sages were here only as tourists.

> So when they have stayed a while in their bodies, and beheld through them all that sense and mortality have to show, they make their way back to the place whence they set out at the first.[52]

Here and in other passages Philo makes it clear that there is great difference between the ordinary man and the constitution of one of the "sages." So, confronted with the young Moses, the people about him were amazed, and could not determine whether the "mind" which was in him was human or divine or a mixture of the two.[53] The ordinary man is, it is true, lost in his new environment, hopelessly expatriated. But provision for divine help is made for all, Philo has already said, in the revelation of Moses. This is what Philo has in mind when he gives thanks that God has not left man's soul entirely bereft of the best, the divine, Form, but has given him wings by which he can fly to the heavenly vision.[54]

With this mystic power to escape the body and return even during this life to God we are not now concerned, though it is often hard to know whether Philo is speaking of the final return or the temporary flight of contemplation. Death is the permanent dissolution of one's spiritual part from the bodily,[55] but on this Philo expressed himself with as much variety as on the formation of the

[52] Conf. 78; cf. 77–82 and Cher. 120.
[53] Mos. i, 27.
[54] QG iv, 234.
[55] Jos. 264; Gig. 31.

combination. He says succinctly that naturally a body dies when the soul leaves it, soul when the reason or mind leaves it, and reason when virtue leaves it.[56] Abraham, the sage, again showed the Stoic pattern of indifference when Sarah died. He wept over her corpse, but only briefly, and then left without further mourning, for the very un-Stoic reason that he knew that at death the soul is not quenched but is released from the body to return to God whence it came.[57]

Clearly the soul or higher mind returns at death to its Source. But it is impossible to say whether for Philo that meant what we should call "personal immortality," or was a spiritual absorption into the Source by which the individual spirit became an anonymous part of the universal Spirit, or whatever it might be called, just as the physical body returned without a trace dust to dust. "Personal immortality" demands that the soul which survives the death of the body should perpetuate the personality. The desire for personal immortality is a desire that "I" survive death, not simply that my parts be redistributed to their original source. On this point Philo disappoints those who look for a distinct statement. He has many passages which seem to promise such a future, but on the whole he is too much interested in the mystic ascent, in the restoration of his soul or mind to its divine Source, to care particularly about what happens to his "ego." In a much discussed passage [58] he brings this out very sharply: "we" have qualities, he says, through being mixed creatures. Before birth, that is before the beginning of this combination, "we" did not exist at all, nor shall "we" exist after death, but shall be rushed forward into rebirth, when we shall be without body, without mixture, and without distinct qualities. That is, we shall be reabsorbed, essentially without personality, in the Source. Coomaraswamy claims that this is equivalent to the Indian triumph of reabsorption in Nirvana, and he seems to me to be right.

So it is entirely fitting that the call to the mystic, which is identical with the call to the soul at death, is that he be a fugitive from himself, put his mind so completely at God's disposal that it is no longer his own. It is not enough for the soul to leave the body, sense perception, and speech (by which Philo means the world of

[56] Det. 141.
[57] Abr. 258.
[58] Cher. 113–118, following Colson's text.

the modern philologian, the world where ideas are words): the soul must depart even from itself in that it loses all sense of distinctiveness from the Cause.[59] The high priest, he says,[60] has the same experience when on Yom Kippur he goes into the Holy of Holies: he goes out of his misapprehension that it is *he* who thinks and understands. Isaac and Moses too came out each from himself into God.[61] Eternal life is a flight *πρὸς τὸ ὄν*, toward Being.[62]

The individual perishes, but, in another way of expressing it, the Forms within him are eternal:

> When a musician or a scholar has died such music or scholarship as can have its abode in individual masters does indeed perish with him, but the original patterns of these remain, and may be said to live as long as the world endures.[63]

Humanity (*ἀνθρωπότης*) is another such Form which as a seal is stamped upon a great number of individual objects; the seal does not perish when the individual impression disappears.[64] Philo has little interest in the individual impressions.

The same notion is expressed when Philo says that the individual at death becomes a Form, or at least that the Sages do. He says that for virtuous and holy men death is a translation and a migration to another place of abode, but that Enoch's translation was his being changed into "an incorporeal idea appreciable only by the intellect," and that Moses and Elijah received the same reward.[65] The same change occurred even in this life to Sarah when her name was altered: by an incredible allegory Philo makes this the change from the part to the whole, the species to the genus, corruption into incorruption.[66] And the promise to Abraham that he would go to his fathers in peace meant to Philo not what he says it meant to many commentators (in hellenized Judaism), namely that Abraham was to be resolved into his elements at death: rather to Philo the promise meant that he was to join the "incorporeal substances," which the Bible (in Philo's allegory) calls angels, but which Philo himself usually called after Plato the Forms.[67]

[59] Heres 69–74.
[60] Ibid. 85; cf. LA iii, 41.
[61] LA iii, 42–44.
[62] Fug. 78.
[63] Det. 75; cf. Mut. 79, 80.
[64] Ibid. 76.
[65] QG i, 86; cf. Mut. 38.
[66] QG iii, 53.
[67] QG iii, 11; cf. ii, 8. The "divine substance" of this passage is apparently what God gives to the pious according to ii, 10. See also Sacr. 5; Heres 276–283, esp. 280,

The identification of the Platonic Forms with the angelic attendants upon God in heaven is a literal absurdity which demonstrates how little words in themselves may be our guide in such discussions.[68] What Philo meant is that the destiny of the truly pious is in the world of Forms, as he says explicitly:

> They (the pious) have risen wholly above the sphere of sense perception and have been translated into the conceptual world (*κόσμος νοητός*), and there have been registered as citizens in the commonwealth of incorruptible and incorporeal Forms.[69]

Or the soul which offers itself as a eucharist, a thank-offering, he says, receives immortality and is inscribed on the records of God as being co-eternal with the sun, moon, and the whole universe.[70] Here the co-citizenship is with the heavenly bodies, but that need not confuse us. It is further quite natural to Philo to represent it that the ascent of Abraham after death, like the Patriarch's mystic ascent while he was alive, was an ascent into communion with, or identification with, the Powers (*δυνάμεις*), Philo's word for his premonitions of the Neo-Platonic emanations from God.[71]

All of this has built up the impression that however the heavenly world was described, the goal for man was that he become absorbed in it, lose his personality This, I believe, was Philo's dearest wish. Yet, paradox upon paradox, he does not hesitate to represent the very Patriarchs, whose virtues would have led them into the experience most fully, as still preserving their individualities in the sense that in heaven, or before God, they serve eternally as intercessors for men. As souls freed from the body, in naked simplicity,

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where Philo says that "some" teach that the return to the "fathers" is return to the archetypal Forms, with which the mind of the Sage is a *μέτοικος* (*μετοικίζεσθαι*). To be a *μέτοικος* with living or dead is found in Sophocles, Antig. 852.

[68] Cumont, usually our best single guide in this field, breaks down when he comes to mystical allegory. He says that the speeches of Julian, in which Julian similarly tries to read Platonic metaphysic and immortality into the myths and rites of paganism, are "destitute of all critical and even of all common sense" (After Life in Roman Paganism 42). I wonder, when we better understand the primitive mythopaeic phenomena, whether we may not come to feel that there is often more understanding of myths in such allegory than in modern rationalistic condescension to them.

[69] Gig. 61. When the righteous are transformed into *ἀθάνατα γένη* in Post. 43 Philo probably means the Forms also. Certainly it is something very impersonal he has in mind.

[70] Mos. ii, 108; cf. Gig. 31.

[71] Det. 159. On the Powers see my By Light, Light, esp. 23 ff. (but see Index s.v.).

they manifest devotion to the Ruler, and make supplication for their sons and daughters while God hears and heeds.[72] But this intercession of the Patriarchs, as Cohn noted, is the invasion of a conception from traditional Judaism into his more usual notion of absorption. The two are literally in complete contradiction, but Philo is not one to let anything of religious value go merely to avoid a contradiction. He names several of the Patriarchs who form this mystic group (*θίασος*), Abel, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, and says that they all have been added to the company of the angels, in which process they were translated into the *ἄφθαρτον καὶ τελεώτατον γένος*, the incorruptible and most perfect genus.[73]

Even higher than these, Philo hastens to add, was Moses. In one passage he says that Moses at death shed his body like the shell of an oyster and rose to God, but stopped on the way to supplicate blessings for the Jewish people which are their abiding treasure.[74] In another passage he says that just before death, apparently at this stage of stopping to intercede for Israel, Moses was given an experience which we must regard as the prototype of the transfiguration of Jesus. Moses was in this experience clearly still alive when God took him,

> who was made up of the duality of soul and body, and transformed him completely into the nature of the uncompounded monad, that is into most sun-like Mind.[75]

Philo is thinking, directly or indirectly, of the "eye of the soul" which even more than the eye of the body is, according to Plato, "most sun-like," the true mind of man by which he perceives the Forms.[76] It is into this that Moses is body and soul transfigured to

[72] Praem. 166, with the note by Colson; QG i, 70.

[73] Sacr. 5–7. Actually in this passage, as Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon, 1908, 240, noted, Philo engages in a fanciful exegesis by which he sends Abraham and Jacob to the angels, i.e. the Forms (*εἴδη*) in the sense of species; Isaac to some *γένος ἄφθαρτον καὶ τελεώτατον* which would presumably be Plato's Form of the Good; and Moses to God himself. I find it hard to take this passage seriously in its details.

[74] Virt. 76–79. Philo echoes here Plato, Phaedrus 250c. On this transformation of Moses see By Light, Light, 195 ff. On Moses and Aaron as suppliants for men see ibid. 231 f.

[75] Mos. ii, 288. This, rather than the Sinai scene to which it is traditionally referred, seems the prototype of the story of Jesus' transfiguration, for the *change* of body is present in both this account and the story of Jesus.

[76] Republic 508. That Plato made the mind of man especially akin to the Forms

make his final prophecies. At Sinai, he tells us, Moses went into God's presence without his body.[77] But whether in the body or out of the body (even to one like Paul who has had the experience himself the way of expressing it is of relative unimportance), Moses at death went beyond the other Patriarchs, for he went beyond species and genus alike, did so without any "adding or taking away" from his nature, to come into the presence of God. This is not to be taken as a sign of what can happen to us at death, or even to the other Patriarchs,[78] for Philo says in the same passage that Moses' incarnation was from the first unique. Moses was sent in the first place only as a loan to the material world, and while he was here he was not restricted to what is the supreme virtue of human nature, the virtue of the true ruler or king to dominate the passions completely; for Moses was a god in the bodily region, with such domination over the bodily constitution as even a king does not know. So, as a god, at death nothing was taken from him or added, because a god by very definition is complete (πλήρης) and in perfect balance (ἰσαίτατος) with himself.[79] We can conclude only that the incarnation of Moses did not imply the "mixture" Philo sees in all other men: Moses, as a god, never took on or lost anything, even in his incarnation. So when he died nothing by way of a tomb could be found. Philo is, for the moment at least, quite docetic in his thought of Moses' incarnation. Furthermore, when Moses is commanded to "stand with God" this also is an elevation at death beyond the Patriarchs. For all other men find eternal life by "flight toward God," [80] but Moses at death was elevated by the Logos to some unique height which Philo says is like God himself.[81] We shall leave this statement in Philo's own terms, for it is indeed dangerous to "add or detract."

Unlike Moses, the ordinary man finds at death his "mixture" dissolved. The obligation of the situation is clear: the mind or soul,

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was noted by J. Maguire in an essay which I hope will soon be published, "Plato's Theory of Natural Law." See Phaedo 76D, 80B, 75E; Rep. ix, 585C; vi, 490B, 508D; x, 611E; Epist. vii, 342D.

[77] QE ii, 46 (Harris, Fragments, 61).

[78] See above n. 73.

[79] Sacr. 8–10.

[80] Fug. 78.

[81] Sacr. 8: τὸν τέλειον (= Moses) ἀπὸ τῶν περιγείων ἀνάγων ὡς ἑαυτόν. Colson translates the ὡς as though it were an εἰς, "to Himself."

or whatever one calls the higher part, which is conquered by the body perishes with the body, while only the soul which has struggled against the "corpse," indeed has killed the corpse, can be said to have any hope of immortality.[82] The death of the soul is its corruption with evil, the decay of its original virtue.[83] With all sincerity he paraphrased Plato when he said that the souls which are able to return whence they came are

> the souls of those who have given themselves to genuine philosophy, who from first to last study to die to the life in the body, that they may share in the life that is incorporeal and incorruptible along with him who is himself without beginning and is incorruptible.[84]

What did Philo believe then about the origin and destiny of the soul? Contradictory as all this has appeared, he has said it all with equal seriousness, and in one way or another it all represents what he believed. Philo was a man of the heart rather than the head, for all his mistaken reputation as an intellectual. If contradiction can be construed as intellectual dishonesty, consistency on the deeper issues of life is much more often emotional dishonesty. Philo's honesty is in honestly presenting his own vacillations. So all the contradictions together make here the total picture of his ideas on the subject of life after death. Yet out of the great variety of figures and expressions a "resultant" does emerge, the closest to which is the Platonic notion that man's problem lies primarily in the struggle between matter and the immaterial. This struggle is represented within each individual in the conflict which his body, along with perhaps its organizing bodily mind, wages against the divine soul, spirit, or higher mind within it. The cosmic implications of this conflict drove Philo into the greatest variety of figures of speech, but made him, more often than not, lose all sense of the importance of the individual person in his greater concern for the principles and elements involved.[85]

Philo's deviations from the Platonic tradition are as important as his conformity to it. There is nothing to correspond in his writ-

[82] See QG i, 75; iv, 46, 66.

[83] LA i, 105–108.

[84] Gig. 13, 14. Colson properly recalls Phaedo 64A, 67E.

[85] In this Philo is more philosophic and less popular than other hellenistic Jewish sources. So Sap. Solom. viii, 19–ix, 18, as well as the Essenes according to Josephus BJ, 154–158, have the same "Orphic" conception of life and death, but lack Philo's and Plato's immaterialism.

ings to the mythical speculation of the Orphic tradition, or to Plato's myths, either in form or in the concern of these myths with explaining how it is that the soul has fallen into incarnation. Secondly Philo seems completely to have rejected the Platonic doctrine of metempsychosis. Thirdly he does not follow Plato in erecting great arguments for immortality. Pythagoreanism, as Cumont has pointed out,[86] relied upon a revelation made to ancient sages in place of such argument, and for Philo the Torah and the Patriarchs took this place. In each of these rejections it is his Jewish foundation which has been the censor.

In his indifference to personal destiny, however, Philo is completely Greek. It is true that the ancient Jewish Sheol destroyed all individuality, but it was no part of Jewish hope or religion to anticipate this experience or to rejoice in it. If the individual Jew seemed content to subordinate his individuality to racial continuity, he was never, without foreign influence, lost in God. Nothing could ever be more fundamentally heretical to the normative Jew than to confuse God and man in any sense. In early days when he looked forward only to Sheol, at least so long as he lived man was intensely personal, worshipping a personal God. When he began to think of a real survival of death he thought at once in terms of a physical resurrection which would guarantee the survival of his ego. For all that Philo has to express himself wherever possible in terms of the biblical "breath" of God, "angels," the Patriarchs and their experiences, he never once moves in this Jewish world of the personal ego. He is familiar with it, as he is familiar with the Greek Hades, but he alludes to both with the same casualness. His personality must often have asserted itself in the hope of survival, and his sense of justice made him occasionally talk of a future retribution which would be meaningless if not personal, but we might say that he thought such things when the body and this world were strongly with him. When the divine emotions were hot, his longing for restoration made it the supreme sin for him to assert his personality, claim any peculiar faculties as the properties of "himself," since the individual can be kept intact only by his isolation from the Source. To this Source Philo would have us turn our eyes, our hearts, our beings.

[86] After Life in Roman Paganism 26.

We can truly understand him, perhaps, when we come to see that the question of personal survival was not clarified in his mind, or important to his emotions, as it was for normative Jews, because he had discovered the greater Reality. It may be valuable in some ways to try to watch our personal reactions while we listen to a great fugue of Bach, but the best way to understand the music itself is to forget ourselves as we follow the sublimity of the counterpoint, in which the many become one. Philo heard at least echoes of the music of the spheres, and the transcendent overtones of the Forms themselves in which the many become One. In this he lost himself, and he asked nothing better here or hereafter than thus to lose himself eternally. Hence mere suggestion sufficed:

> If anyone dies with respect to the mortal life, but, taking immortal life in exchange, shall live, perhaps he shall see what he never saw before.[87]

Did all Jews in Philo's environment do the same? We cannot conclude so, since his own great variety of expression and contradiction seems in good part to come from the variety of Jewish adaptations to the Greek mind. The Posidonius-Stoic element which most commentators stress in Philo has long seemed to me a trace of speech-forms of other Jews Philo knew, Jews who were as Stoic in this sense as Philo was certainly not. There probably never was such a thing as an "Alexandrian Jewish" point of view, any more than today there is a single Jewish point of view typical of New York or London.[88] But Philo tells us, both by his variety of figures and by his deeply central orientation in Orphic-Platonic thought, that the Jews of that day borrowed ideas (and presumably symbols in art) not merely as clichés, but to the profound modification of their Jewish heritage. What deeply impressed Philo, and presumably many other Jews, was the divine Logos-Light [89] which Greek tradition taught him to see with the "eye of his mind." Thereafter his demand, in this world and the next, was simply for more of that Light.

[87] Fragment, ap. Harris, Fragments 72a: *Ἐὰν δὲ ἀποθάνῃ μέν τις τὸν θνητὸν βίον, ζήσῃ δὲ ἀντιλαβὼν τὸν ἀθάνατον, ἴσως δ μηδέποτε εἶδεν ὄψεται.*

[88] A quite different view of immortality, for example, is found in IV Maccabees, where Greek elements in general are almost as pronounced as in Philo, but where the expectation of immortality is definitely Jewish in the sense that it is strongly personal.

[89] On the Logos-River: Fug. 97.

THE "WORLD" CONCEPT AMONG JEHOVAH'S WITNESSES

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Various concepts bearing the label of "the world" have held an important place among the categories in terms of which men of many times and places have organized their experience. The present article attempts a case study of a single one of these — that developed by Jehovah's witnesses.

First we shall examine a number of contexts of the group's life in the verbal formulations with respect to which "the world" plays a conspicuous rôle. The study of these contexts will serve to reveal several of the ways in which are manifested the sentiments or attitudes of the witnesses toward the world and its content. In the next section we shall take a look at the manner in which certain factors qualify and limit the expression of these sentiments in the everyday lives of the witnesses. This discussion will include a brief examination of the interactions between "the world" and the witnesses and between the attitudes of each toward the other. Up to this point we shall find it convenient to make the somewhat inaccurate assumption of an identity between "the world" and all people and things standing outside the witnesses' own group; but in the final section we shall enquire, as a problem in the sociology of knowledge, specifically into the content of the category, the nature and basis of the unity ascribed to it, its relation to other concepts used in the group's thinking, and the motives leading to its development.

I. The "World" Concept at it Appears in Various Contexts

At the present time, the witnesses never tire of pointing out, "The whole world is in a state of perplexity and distress." The peoples of earth are suffering from poverty, unemployment, war, and strife of all kinds, cruel dictators, etc., etc., as never before. There is absolutely nothing which imperfect man, including themselves, can do about this situation, though for generations men have striven to better the common lot. The one hope is to put

one's trust in Jehovah God and Christ Jesus, who are shortly to destroy their enemies at Armageddon and establish peace and righteousness on the earth under the Theocracy. Therefore the only important duty devolving upon the Christian is the spreading of the Kingdom message, so that the people may have an opportunity to choose, while there is yet time, to take their stand on the Lord's side, so receiving the gift of everlasting life, or on that of the Devil, so going down in destruction. From all efforts to promote political and social reform, to foster world peace, to alleviate poverty and suffering, etc. — even from all charitable enterprise — witnesses prefer to remain completely disassociated.[1]

Neutrality in World War II

In the Watchtower, the group's official organ, issue of November 1, 1939, the then president of the Society, Judge Joseph F. Rutherford, published an article entitled "Neutrality," seeking to define "clearly and definitely" the position of the witnesses with regard to the war which had broken out two months earlier. Below I give a summary of some of its chief points:

"The words of Jesus, spoken to his disciples, apply to all persons who have made a covenant to be obedient to Almighty God. Concerning such Jesus says: 'They are not of the world, even as I am not of the world.' (John 17:16) . . . Jehovah's witnesses are set aside and commissioned by Jehovah God to be the representatives [i.e. by "witnessing," spreading the Kingdom message] on the earth of the Most High, the great Theocrat. Jehovah's witnesses are not a political or religious organization, and they have no part in the political affairs of this world, not even of the nations wherein they have their domicile. . . . Every nation on the earth . . . endorses and practices religion, and religion and politics operate together, and not one of such nations is for the Theocratic Government of Jehovah, but all are against it. The nations of the earth pursue the selfish course for commercial and political gain. Some of these nations call themselves 'Christian' nations, but they are all opposed to the kingdom of God by Christ Jesus. Every

[1] Parallels to this "fatalistic" attitude may be found in the view of those political radicals who disclaim interest in reform within the framework of the capitalistic system. Various ideological parallels with Communism are discussed by H. H. Stroup, "Class Theories of the Jehovah's Witnesses," Social Science, XIX (1944), 94–97; see also the same author's The Jehovah's Witnesses, New York (Columbia University Press), 1945.

religious institution under the sun has some part in the affairs of this world, and therefore constitutes a part of this world; and that explains why the rulers of the nations of this world do not hate the religious systems, as Jesus states his followers are hated for his name's sake. That proves that these religious systems are not for the name of Jehovah God nor for the name of Christ Jesus, but against God and his kingdom. The instructions given to those who are for the Theocratic government are that their citizenship is in heaven and their duty is to be entirely loyal and faithful to the heavenly government by Christ Jesus. . . . One could not be a soldier of Jesus Christ and at the same time a soldier of the nation that is under the supervision of God's enemy, the Devil. Hence the Christian does not entangle himself with the affairs of this world. . . . The only reason for any of the true followers of Christ Jesus to now be upon the earth is that they might bear witness to the name of Jehovah God and proclaims his Kingdom."

We must specially note that the witnesses' objection is not a pacifistic one to any and all forms of war and violence that might be conceived. For the reason that they were specifically authorized by Jehovah, some of the wars waged by Israel, "God's typical nation," were righteous. But none of the nations of Christendom have or ever did have such authorization. "There is nothing, therefore, that would justify the true Christian in obeying the political and religious rulers in taking up arms for aggressive war or even for defensive war of one worldly nation against another worldly nation." But when faced with mob violence during meetings or when out witnessing, they claim, and have not infrequently exercised, the right of self-defense.[2] In answer to the question, "Would you defend your mother from attack?" frequently addressed to conscientious objectors in the effort to embarrass them, the article recommends the answer that the Christian ought to defend his brother, sister, or mother in "the family rela-

[2] A notable instance occurred on August 20, 1940, at North Windham, Maine. Deputy Sheriff E. Dean Pray, a man active in American Legion circles, was fatally shot by Arthur F. Cox, one of Jehovah's witnesses, whom, with another brother, Pray was attempting to drive from his filling station following an attempt to witness to him. The defense alleged that Pray was brandishing a tire iron, and that Cox was merely acting in self-defense. However, he was found guilty on a murder charge and was sentenced to life imprisonment. While he was supported by them in his defense, many brothers felt, as I heard several remark, that Cox had no business to be carrying firearms, and that there was reason to believe he was overly hasty in his action.

tionship of the family of God"; but "the fact that one has a brother and sister and mother after the flesh but who are against the Theocracy by Christ Jesus does not at all mean that the Christian is under any obligation whatsoever to care for or protect such opponent of the kingdom." This is perhaps the most radical formulation in the article of the idea of the Christian's duty of exclusive devotion to the kingdom in disregard of those counter claims upon him of "worldly" elements which the witnesses, as we shall see, often find it difficult to renounce.

The neutrality of Jehovah's witnesses is carried even to the point of non-interference with the conscription of others:

> "It is the privilege of all nations to fight it out amongst themselves, but the Christian must not interfere, by word or act, with the governments in any action they may take with reference to the conscription of men or material for the war. The covenant people of God must keep their hands off, because it is not their fight and it would be wrong to try to induce others not to fight. Each one must determine for himself his relationship to God and his government."

Undoubtedly Judge Rutherford, a man with legal training, introduced this passage largely with a view to its use as an exhibit on occasions when witnesses might find themselves faced, as he himself was during World War I, with the charge of urging resistance to the conscription laws. However, it is equally certain that more than merely ulterior motives are involved, and that the passage expresses genuine and important sentiments of the group of which it is important for present purposes that we should take note. In support of this conclusion the following three considerations may be advanced:

(a) Reflecting one of the most characteristic group sentiments of the witnesses, a kind of individualism (note the very typical expression of this in the last sentence of the above quotation), they rarely indulge in strong and explicit exhortation to people either to do or not to do *anything*. In a manner typical of the mildness of social pressure [3] in the group, their usual procedure is to point out what they conceive to be the "facts" relative to

[3] See the author's Some Problems in the Integration of Social Groups, With Special Reference to Jehovah's Witnesses, doctoral thesis (unpublished) submitted to the Department of Sociology, Harvard University, 1942.

salvation, leaving it to each individual to determine his conduct in the light of them.

(b) An outside observer might feel inclined to contend that surely the whole *Neutrality* article is nothing if not an attempt to prove that participation in modern wars is contrary to the Scriptures and consequently very wicked. How, therefore, could the publication of the article in effect be anything but an attempt to persuade its readers to resist conscription? This may or may not be the case within the meaning of the law; the question need not concern us. But to view the article from the standpoint of its meaning and significance to the witnesses as being motivated merely by such an attempt on their part would be to fail to view it in the context of certain important phases of the outlook of the group, and to do gross violence to the manner in which any witness would conceive the situation.

Our outside observer's error consists in his placing far too little emphasis on the manner in which the witnesses feel themselves to be a "group apart" from the world. He reads into them his conception of various pacifistic groups whose conscientious objection to war is in important ways different in nature and motivation. The general run of such groups disapprove of war as "an instrument of national policy"; the witnesses stand aloof from questions as to such "national instruments." While these others are interested in the abolition of war as a matter of social reform, the witnesses are indifferent to social reform. While, as radical reformers, the aspirations of these other groups may run largely counter to the more general trends, their hopes nevertheless remain centered in existing institutions, however greatly they may wish to alter them; whereas the hope of the witnesses centers in the establishment by supernatural agencies of a completely new society, involving the complete destruction of these institutions. To them the issue is one of "neutrality"; they must not participate in a quarrel which is none of their business.[4] While modern war

[4] The witnesses greatly prefer to gain draft exemption through classification in 4D (ministers of religion) rather than 4E (consciencious objectors). Failing to achieve the former status, many prefer imprisonment to C. O. camps. A large proportion of those serving Federal sentences for draft evasion during the recent war have been witnesses. These brethren justify their refusal on the ground that they must acquiesce in nothing necessitating a discontinuance of their all-important witnessing activities. To other C. O.'s life in a small community of like-minded men,

is as great an evil in their eyes as in those of any other group, its occurrence between worldly nations they tend to view, as we shall presently find them viewing other shortcomings of the world, with a note of cynical aloofness, taking satisfaction, even amusement, in pointing to it as evidence in support of their convictions concerning the world's sad state. To them there would probably be no particular virtue in conscientious objection uncoupled with other and more important signs of devotion to the Theocracy. Notice particularly that the emphasis, as will appear on a rereading of the above quotation, is on what the *Christian*, or the *covenant people of God*, and not men in general, ought to do. Motivation for urging others to resist conscription is thus lacking in the group sentiments, whereas these sentiments, and the manner in which the group defines the situation relative to its neutrality, strongly incline it to refrain from such interference. It feels itself not unlike a group of aliens living in a foreign country — "We are a nation without a country" is a phrase often heard on their lips.

(c) In corroboration of the complete sincerity of the witnesses in this matter, and in further illustration of their sentiment of apartness from the world, I offer the following observations, in which there can be little question of ulterior motives: On two occasions I have seen brethren approached, during the period of popular debate over the proper stand of the United States with respect to World War II, by persons circulating anti-war petitions — one of the petitioners announcing himself as an agent of the Communist Party. Each time, much to the apparent bewilderment of the petitioners, who doubtless, having heard of the "pacifist" leanings of the witnesses, felt confident of securing from them many signatures, the brethren refused to sign, giving

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where they can carry on work which is, or which they hope may be, more or less congenial to them and to their interests, may hold out attractive prospects; but to the witnesses, whose principal group activity cannot be extensively pursued within the camps, to live in a community under the supervision of the Devil's world would hold no very attractive prospects. In personal conversation, C. O.'s of other faiths have expressed to me respect for the witnesses for their courage, etc., but have informed me that those brethren who have gone to the camps, while hard workers, tend to remain aloof from, and disinterested in, much of the life of the rest of the community. In the light of the present discussion, this is not to be wondered at. All this, furthermore, is one more indication that to the witnesses the issue is not primarily one of an objection to participation in warfare as such.

reasons similar to those which we shall presently find them giving for their refusal to exercise the franchise, alleging that it would be wrong for them to meddle in a matter of purely worldly concern; it was for the Lord to allow the United States to go to war or to refrain from doing so, according as it suited his purposes, and it was not for them to interfere.

To return to the article *Neutrality*: Contacts with the world are conceived as involving *contamination* — a fact we shall presently find important in connection with ascetism:

"Those who are for the great THEOCRACY . . . must keep themselves unblemished and uncontaminated from the affairs of the nations of earth, which are against the great THEOCRAT. . . . By the truth of Jehovah's Word they are completely set aside to his exclusive service. Therefore such are commanded to 'keep themselves unspotted from the world'. (Jas. 1:27) . . . Those who worship God in spirit and in truth must do that very thing. Such constitutes the true worship of Almighty God."

THE FLAG SALUTE

A number of the viewpoints we have already encountered together with some others, are to be found in the following statement: [5]

The discussion starts with the assertion that the Christian should obey the laws of men ("render unto Caesar") insofar as they do not conflict with God's laws, but that where there is such a conflict he must obey the latter ("render unto God"). It then continues: "An image, as defined by the Scriptures, means a 'representation, a figure, a symbol; that is, something that stands for and in the place of another'. . . . 'Bowing down,' as used in the Scriptures, means to do reverence, obeissance; to worship. It is the purpose of the Devil to cause men to reproach God's name that destruction of man may result. For the specific protection of those who have agreed to do God's will [6] the Most High gives this commandment:" at which point Exodus 20:3–5. the First and Second Commandments, are quoted.

Here again is elaborated the thesis of an identification between the ruling nations and the Devil; to salute a symbol of the former is to worship the latter:

[5] J. F. Rutherford, Salvation, (Brooklyn, 1939), 257–265.
[6] Notice that here, again, the emphasis is on *Christians*, not on men in general.

"In the beginning Lucifer was appointed as a God or invisible overlord of man, and when he rebelled his name was changed to 'Satan' and 'Devil' (Ezekiel 28:13–15; Isaiah 14:12–15), but his power to control men was not taken away. Therefore Satan is the 'god' or invisible ruler of the wicked world, and the Scriptures plainly so state. (John 12:31; 14:30; 2 Corinthians 4:4; Psalms 110:1, 6). The above scriptures and the extraneous evidence show that the nations of the world are under the control of Satan. (James 4:4; 1 John 5:19 A.R.V.) Flags of the various nations represent the government and what the government stands for. The law of the nation or government that compels the child of God to salute the national flag compels that person to salute the Devil as the invisible god of the nation. The Christian, therefore, must choose to yield to God's enemy or to remain faithful and true to Almighty God." Clearly no Christian could salute the German swastika without violating God's law; but does the same apply to the American flag? Yes; for to do so attributes "protection and salvation," which in fact come only from the Lord, to "the ruling power of the government, all of whom are against Jehovah God and his kingdom under Christ. Not a single officer in the American government is for God's kingdom."

It is extremely important for us to note that for the witnesses flag saluting is a ritual richly infused with meaning. Their devaluation of it takes quite a different direction from that of the cynic who regards the ritual, if he has any attitude at all, as "silly." Beyond the view that it attributes "protection and salvation," their conception corresponds to that of the ardent patriot [7] — indeed, if there was not this correspondence the basis of the witnesses' objection would disappear:

"If the saluting of the flag meant merely this: 'By saluting the flag [I mean that] I will obey every law of the land that is not contrary to God's law,' then everyone could salute it with absolute impunity." The writer then quotes two "worldly authorities," one a publication of the Daughters of the American Revolution, to the effect that the flag is something "sacred," "like the cross," that reverence, devotion, and service are its due, etc.

For the witnesses, as for the patriot, the flag is sacred in Durkheim's sense — for neither is it merely profane. It is symbolical

[7] Doubltess many witness children have a far keener sense for the official meaning of the flag than the children of most American Legionaires!

of country, the ritual of devotion and reverence for it. The difference arises in connection with the meanings or definitions of the situation with respect to the country; for the patriot, the sentiments expressed by the ritual do not clash with other sentiments; while for the witness, with his identification of nations with "the world" and the Devil, there is a very sharp clash indeed. Reverence, devotion, and expressions of like sentiments are due only to Jehovah — and certainly not to a symbol of the world, given the attitudes which the witnesses have toward it.

The Exercise of the Franchise

Finally we may consider the refusal of the witnesses to exercise the franchise. Shortly prior to the holding of local elections in his area, I asked a brother how he proposed to vote. He replied that he was not going to vote at all, for the Christian was commanded to break off all connections with "the world," to stand completely aloof from its concerns. I suggested that in certain instances, as where a candidate, not necessarily a righteous man, but one not especially noted for his opposition to the Lord's people, was opposed by a man who was thus famed, it might be worth while to vote for the man less likely to interfere with the Kingdom work. He said he saw my point, but that, by goodness, he just didn't feel he could bring himself to do such a thing. His manner suggested that to him there was involved in voting for a man not one of God's people a *contamination* with the world which was more than he could contemplate with equanimity — and, of course, no brother would, or ought to, do such a thing as run for office. On another and comparable occasion another brother took a similar line; he seemed to feel that in voting one expressed some sort of *faith* in the candidate, or showed one's *approval* of a man devoted to the world. In other words, he seemed to think of voting, like flag saluting, as having a symbolic meaning comparable to that of a ritual act — and a meaning involving conflict with his ideals. Indeed, he himself volunteered that voting and flag saluting were in similar positions, and that a brother participating in either would forfeit his Kingdom chances.

Thus, we have seen exemplified, in several contexts, the use to which the witnesses put their category of *the world*. The things

which they place in this category we have found to be the objects of certain *currents of sentiment*; indeed, we shall see that it is only *as* such objects that they are included in the category. This current of sentiment we may attempt to characterize briefly as running in the direction of certain kinds of *hostility*, *antagonism*, *disapproval*, etc., qualified by trends toward a peculiar *aloofness*, or sense of constituting a *group apart*.

II. Limitations in the Everyday Manifestations of Attitudes toward "The World"

In order that an adequate understanding of the situation may be gained, consideration must be given to the manner in which these sentiments "work themselves out" in the everyday life of the rank-and-file witnesses, and to the way in which certain factors, especially ambivalent sentiments, operate to limit the lengths to which their expression goes.

Inclinations toward "Monastic" Living

The trend toward "aloofness," whose manifestations in three contexts we have examined, finds further, more informal, expression in a "monastic" trend toward the maintenance of themselves as a "group apart" or community whose members live their lives and circumscribe their interests, social relations, and loyalties within their own group. Thus, as we shall see further in discussing asceticism, witnesses are under some pressure to restrict their recreational and marriage activities to those with their brethren. Although, as we shall see, accepted as often unavoidable, many witnesses find their worldly jobs distasteful and dream of some day becoming "pioneers" (full-time witnesses), or of joining one of the several "Bethel families." These latter, who staff the Society's headquarters and branch offices, live according to a somewhat monastic, communal pattern.[8] But this monastic trend remains only an incipient one, being arrested by a number of factors. Because the group is small and scattered, its very full realization would be, if not impossible, at least difficult. Distasteful worldly contacts, as we shall observe, are justified on grounds of

[8] See 1944 Yearbook of Jehovah's Witnesses (Brooklyn, 1943), 45 ff.

"realism." But perhaps the most interesting restraining factor derives from the very nature of the group's main activity. Thus a number of "Kingdom farms," [9] staffed entirely by brethren, have been established; but these enterprises have not received great prominence, and many are somewhat skeptical of their value, viewing them as distractions from the all-important business of witnessing, with which nothing should be allowed to interfere. For the same reason the Society refused to concern itself actively with the "Kingdom schools" established by local brethren for children expelled from other institutions for their refusal to salute the flag; yet the monastic trend shows itself in a preference of parents for having their children attend such schools, although, significantly, children were not admitted unless they had actually been expelled from other schools. For the same reason, again, the Society declines to assume the burden of organizing CPS camps for its conscientious objectors.[10] In short, nothing may be allowed to interfere with witnessing, an activity which necessarily cannot be confined to an isolated community but must imply interaction with outsiders and an interest in them — albeit an interest of a special kind. Even if not related to it by ties of loyalty, the witnesses are thus a part of "society" if this is conceived as a system of interacting individuals of which a *group* united by common loyalties is only one type.

"The World's" Attitudes toward the Witnesses

The attitudes of the witnesses toward outsiders — these being essential elements of "the world" — and the attitudes of outsiders toward the witnesses are in a state of mutual dependence. While the main concern here is only with the first term of this relationship, the second is important to the understanding of the first, and is of such great inherent interest, that brief treatment must be given to it also.

[9] The tendency of the witnesses and others like them to show special interest in agricultural work — conducted "far from the noise and din of this dying, war-torn old world" (1944 Yearbook of Jehovah's Witnesses, Brooklyn, 1943, p. 39) — is presumably connected with their almost misanthropic tendency to glorify the Divine, identified with "nature," at human expense.

It is significant that the suspicion is less of those farms operated in direct conjunction with the Bethel families and to provide provisions for these.

[10] Cf. n. 4.

The main sources of hostile attitudes toward the witnesses we may consider under the following three headings:

(a) The witnesses refuse to conform their behavior to what many consider the requirements of "patriotism." In the resulting conflict the rôle played by any *intrinsic jeopardy* in which their activities place the realization of these values appears to be but slight. Their attitudes do not prevent their contribution to the economic wealth and prosperity of their nation from being at least on a par with that of others of corresponding social class; and their behavior must be admitted to be exemplary from the point of view of conformity with most of the ordinary standards of observance of laws, of orderliness, and of morals. In the one sphere where their noncoöperation might be thought to interfere most directly with patriotic interests — that of military service — they have encountered less hostility than in other connections.[11] More important is their refusal to give *symbolic expression*, as by flag-saluting, in recognized ways to these values, and — though probably less important — their positive expression, verbally and in writing, of contrary values, as in assertions that their country's government is under the Devil's control. This is not to say, of course, that some do not rationalize their hostility by finding intrinsic dangers to the causes they hold dear where such dangers are in fact lacking.

(b) By their attacks upon other faiths, the witnesses come into sharp conflict with the values of these faiths. We may again distinguish intrinsic and symbolic levels at which the conflict takes place. Preëminent in the former connection is the fear of these faiths — especially of those with a highly developed group consciousness, such as the Roman Catholic — of losing adherents. While the numerical weakness of the witnesses indicates that they have not constituted a major threat to the dominance of the established churches, the threat is not entirely absent, as their success in converting fair numbers of even Catholics attests. The fact that

[11] Thus, though nonparticipation was at times ignored by sympathetic teachers, no formal status of "conscientious objection" to flag-saluting was ever established. A factor in this was probably the lack of the precedent of similar objections by other groups enjoying, like the Quakers, high popular esteem, who had already fought and won the battles leading to the formal definition of a special status for objectors to military service.

the competition is from nonprofessionals, together with the fact that the witnesses refuse to conform to the tradition of the "gentleman's agreement" whereby the Christian denominations refrain from at least open competition among themselves,[12] may account further for the irritation of many on this score.

At this point we may mention the frequently-heard accusation that the witnesses tend to "spread hatred." They certainly make themselves the object of hatred; and the accusation may well in part result from an attributing by projection to them and those hearing their message of comparable, complimentary hatreds. Furthermore, the past and present prevalence of various Fascist movements and such organizations as the Ku Klux Klan, who make the members as such of other groups, as well as such groups themselves and their policies, the objects of their attack, has led to the witnesses' becoming identified [13] in the minds of many with these movements, and to the attribution to them of hatreds more in their tradition. But it is not by accident that the witnesses make such extensive use of the cumbersome phrase, "Roman Catholic *Hierarchy*"; for if they are to win Catholic converts, they must be careful to restrict their attacks to the Church organization as such; and it must not be forgotten that their ranks comprise appreciable numbers of ex-Catholics — in marked contrast to the Klan.

Conflict between values at the symbolic level is felt as "desecration." In its more extreme manifestations this arises in connection with such slogans as "religion is a snare and a racket," although the witnesses are unable to escape arousing hostile reactions by more restrained expressions of their views concerning the status under the Devil's rule of religion.

(c) Mention is frequently made of various minor annoyances which, though they may perhaps play some causal rôle as supplementary irritants in combination with more cogent factors, are

[12] In general terms, this implies a lack of certain institutional controls, present as between other rival faiths, to regulate the interaction between the witnesses and other groups. Often the witnesses define the situation relative to their outside relationships differently from that in wider acceptation, as in their insistence upon the mutual exclusiveness of certain patterns which the more generally accepted tradition defines as merely supplementary.

[13] Indeed, they are often suspected and accused of being actually Communistic, Fascistic, or otherwise "subversive"!

probably of chief significance merely as rationalizations or as pretexts for the application of legal sanctions. Thus the witnesses have been accused of causing the littering of the streets, of interfering with traffic, of disturbing householders by continually ringing their doorbells, of inducing their minor children to peddle literature and of doing the same thing themselves on the Sabbath, etc., etc.

Important as both a cause and an effect of the hostile sentiments associated with the sources of irritation we have been considering is the feeling that the witnesses are "alien," or "outsiders," to a community. Thus witnesses report that where they are well known and respected in their communities and enjoy active ties with nonwitnesses in contexts unrelated to witnessing activities, especially business and professional relationships carrying a measure of prestige, they tend to encounter less hostility than elsewhere. Violence, and the attempt to "run them out of town," seems to have been most common against them where they are outsiders in small cities, in which the sense of community solidarity would be especially strong. In the popular mind they are frequently identified with foreigners who should be made to "go back where they came from."

Just as the witnesses display, as we shall presently see, a variety of often ambivalently related attitudes toward the world, so the latter displays a still wider variety of attitudes toward them; for as well as ambivalences and unclear definitions in individual attitudes, there is wide disagreement between different sections of the population. These currents of sentiment — reactions to the above irritants and to other factors productive of friendliness — we may for convenience in exposition classify as follows:

(a) There is the extreme hostility of many members of such patriotic organizations as the American Legion.

(b) There is the extreme hostility of many of the more ardent members of various other faiths, especially where there is a highly developed group-consciousness, as in Roman Catholicism.

(c) There are persons with attitudes similar to those described under (a) and (b), but who lack the supporting, strengthening, and stabilizing influences upon them of membership ties in groups to whose organized life these attitudes are important.

Persons who fall into one or more of the above three classes tend to show clearly on any occasion when they become involved with the witnesses active hostility, expressed in such ways as rude and contemptuous behavior to witnesses in personal contacts, advocacy of police action and legislation to restrict their activities or of the denial to them of employment and other privileges and rights, a readiness to participate in or to sympathize with the resort to violence or other extra-legal measures against them. At times, however, some of these manifestations may be restricted in their operation by sentiments incompatible with them, e.g., concern for law and order.

(d) There are persons holding attitudes that are relatively neutral, but which are characterized by feelings of "superiority" as manifested in somewhat contemptuous or condescending behavior, assertions to the effect that they are "queer," "eccentric," "ignorant," "naïve," "crackpots," and the like, together with a disposition to believe that they are more poverty-stricken and less well educated than is the fact, and to feel surprised on discovering them to be more "attractive," more "normal," "better dressed," etc., than had been imagined. However, this current of a lack of *respect* [14] tends to accompany also the more hostile and even many of the more friendly attitudes.

(e) Turning now to those who show friendly attitudes we come first to the broad category who, while not concurring entirely with the witnesses on all points, do nevertheless share with them sufficient sentiments to lead them to partial identification with the witnesses and consequently to feel themselves in some measure to be "kindred spirits." Thus, some hostile to what they consider excessive nationalism, feel some admiration for a group showing courage in opposing this sentiment and the groups advocating it. There are "intellectuals" who perhaps feel themselves perceptibly outside some of the currents of their times and who consequently

[14] Probably related to this attitude as both cause and effect is an apparent American tendency, in both the framing and the administration of ordinances, to attempt to deal with violence and the threat thereof by the imposition of restraints upon the witnesses and other unpopular movements as inciters to violence rather than upon the actual initiators of the violence who respond to the "incitement." Cf. American Civil Liberties Union pamphlet, "The Persecution of Jehovah's Witnesses," New York, 1941. In this connection American and British policies seem to present a noticeable contrast.

show a degree of hostility — though manifested in different spheres — toward constituted authority and privilege and toward certain values currently dominant in their community, an hostility comparable to that of the witnesses. There are "liberals" who identify themselves with, or at least show a regular tendency to sympathize with, "underdogs" conceived as "underprivileged" or "persecuted," or who, as strong supporters of the cause of civil liberties, even feel that the witnesses are benefitting this cause by fighting for and winning in the courts decisions favorable to it. Finally, we have persons showing partial identification on the basis of one point or another of similarity in the sphere of religious sentiment, often with an admiration resulting from a feeling that they approximate even closer than themselves to realization of certain of their own ideals. Though in the nondogmatic character of their religion they stand at the opposite pole, the most conspicuous of these persons are representatives of "Liberal Protestantism." They tend to admire what they consider — and with reason — the close resemblances of the witnesses to the early Christians, to respect their "guts" and "sincerity." Some Protestant clergymen, with an undercurrent of hostility to Roman Catholicism, but which their professional code restricts their ability to express publicly, perhaps feel admiration, not untouched with envy, for the witnesses, who refuse to be thus bound.

(f) Finally, we have the potential converts. These show not only great friendliness — as determined by a favorable combination of the factors mentioned above — but a respect for the witnesses and their message, which is not felt to be "quaint," but a thing to be "taken seriously" and weighed with an earnestly receptive mind as to the cogency of its arguments. This suggestibility is probably prevented from developing in many persons primarily because of elements associated with class affiliation and cultural and educational background generally. Furthermore, to be potentially an active witness, not merely the ideology but also participation with the witnesses, who must be found congenial, in their extremely arduous activities of spreading the Kingdom message, must make an appeal through satisfying various "needs." [15]

[15] Elsewhere (see n. 3) I have attempted to define at length the principal "bases of the group's appeal."

It is to the manifestations of such various sentiments of outsiders that those of the witnesses stand in a relationship of mutual dependence. Rivalry and hostility between the members of a group and those outside it commonly tends, of course, to strengthen the cohesiveness of the members and to make vivid the contrast between themselves, as members, and outsiders. We may then construe the witnesses' views about the world as partly a manifestation or expression, in a form congenial to the particular group, of such sentiments of cohesiveness. Furthermore, as the Lord is conceived as standing in opposition to the Devil, in a parallel way the witness finds the world continually opposing him; it is thus through the interaction occurring in his outside contacts that he receives his most constant and vivid personal impressions corroborative of and illustrative of that picture of the world's being under the Devil's control which is presented by his ideology. The great importance and meaningfulness to the witnesses of these contacts with the world is indicated by the space in their magazines devoted to reports of those which individuals have felt to be especially memorable, especially of their more notable "field experiences" which they have had on witnessing expeditions; and even more significant is the keen interest they display during personal conversation in exchanging accounts of such experiences.[16]

An examination of these reports suggests that they were deemed noteworthy for the reason that they refer either to an especially *good*, or to an especially *bad*, reception of the witness by an outsider, or to a combination of the two, in which obstacles to the giving of a good witness were successfully overcome. The experiences are very commonly related to the group's ideology[17]—

[16] By this interchange the witnesses also promote each other's zeal and enthusiasm. Where he has had a painful or frustrating experience, an individual is guaranteed a sympathizing audience; where his witnessing efforts have met with notable success, he is guaranteed an admiring one.

[17] As we shall see later, this ideology offers an explanation of the "meaning" of frustrations, including those consequent upon rebuffs experienced during witnessing. The more active in group activities a witness is, the greater may thus be expected to become the need for the ideology and vividness of the latter, and this increased vividness would in turn promote greater activity. We thus find a basis for a possible cumulative effect, whereby the appeal to an individual of membership in a group would tend to increase with continued association with it. These considerations have also a clear relevance to the explanation of the tendency, if it is a tendency, for persecution to promote enthusiasm.

interpreted in its light and narrated in the group's peculiar terminology derived from it. Thus, hostile persons are "goats," those showing appreciation for the message are "sheep," "Jonadabs," or "persons of good will," persons acting with physical violence against them are thereby revealed as "demonized," the marked differences in the manner in which people receive the message and treat them generally illustrates how the Lord is "dividing the people," where the threat of danger is successfully met, the Lord is "protecting his people," and so on.

It thus appears that the mutual hostilities of the witnesses and various outside individuals and groups are in large part mutually interdependent, constituting a "vicious circle." Therefore it is no cause for surprise that, in general, the organizations most hostile to the witnesses, such as the Roman Catholic Church and the American Legion, are also the special targets of witness hostility. The question as to which hostility is in the "prior" position is probably unanswerable because meaningless.

Qualifications Deriving from the Theological System Itself

Apart from the "remnant" — those now living who on their death are to be "reborn as spirit creatures" to rule with Christ as members of the 144,000 "elect" or "body of Christ" class, whose expectations are now less prominently featured — the salvation which is the group's hope involves a perfect society *on the earth* in which human creatures will be "perfected," receive the gift of everlasting life, and be restored to the "Edenic condition." Thus the witnesses' attitudes do not imply an otherworldly orientation toward some transcendental realm of experience totally different from that in which men now live.[18] While deliverance from human suffering is to be achieved exclusively through special divine — that is, strictly supernatural and extra-human — agencies, this is to involve an ideal political arrangement or

[18] Of course, this does not mean that their hope is not often discussed in transcendental terms or does not embrace also transcendental elements. As I have shown elsewhere ("Some Notable Features in the Authority Structure of a Sect," Social Forces, XXI, 1943, 344–350), they have a fairly vivid sense of leadership by Jehovah and Christ. They often refer to the experience of a "vision of the Theocracy," meaning a sense or feeling that it is now in operation.

"government." Thus the movement takes on certain political implications — reflected in the term "Theocracy" — in spite of its noninterventionist tendencies.

Further promoting and reflecting the peculiar kinds of interest — rather than mere disinterest — which the witnesses take in "worldly" events, are two further peculiarities in their theological system.

Firstly, like a mythology, the major emphasis of the system is on events at definite points in time rather than on the immutable qualities and interrelationships of entities. It is a philosophy of history embracing a "chronology" of past, present, and future events in the history of the universe, providing a general framework into which they are fitted and with respect to which they are evaluated and given "meaning" — a view of the principal forces, associated with the activities of Jehovah and Satan, behind these events and the order in which they were unfolded.

Secondly, in contrast with the more usual tendencies toward fixity, the witnesses' theological system is frankly conceived to be a continually growing and changing thing, new knowledge being constantly added. It is held that these changes are derived, not through personal revelation, but through the Lord's bringing to pass "physical events" which may then be seen as the fulfillment of prophecy, thus permitting for the first time an understanding of the scripture in question.[19] While many of these physical facts are events in the group's own life, many are not, with the consequence that attention is oriented toward worldly events.

Ambivalent Attitudes

The picture is greatly complicated by the fact that these sentiments of "hostile aloofness" toward the entities which the witnesses place in their category of "the world" share the stage with tendencies standing to them in relationships of various sorts of conflict or ambivalence. The various resulting situations and the factors giving rise to them must now be considered.

Such a factor as a sentiment, ideal, or "need" may come to

[19] The significance of this for the group's authority structure I have discussed in the article mentioned in the preceding note.

expression in — that is, lead to the development of by a group or the acceptance of by an individual joining the group in response to his "needs" — some relatively well-crystallized, stable, and "objective" structure of such things as formal beliefs, enacted laws, principles, defined (especially codified) values, or institutions. Once this happens, conflicts with other sentiments (ideals, needs, etc.) — whether similarly "objectified" or not — would appear especially likely to develop. Where one of two conflicting sentiments becomes thus objectified, the conflict may be sharpened; or the objectification may give rise to conflicts previously entirely unapparent. Finally, under some circumstances, the objectification may give rise to conflicts with the very sentiment which has been objectified — as where norms governing the interpretation of laws in general cause them to be so administered as to thwart the very "purpose" for which the laws in question were originally enacted, with a consequent felt conflict between the "spirit" and the "letter" of the law.

Such conflicts may, however, be prevented from developing, or their sharpness mitigated, if the objectification proceeds along directions guided by each of the potentially conflicting tendencies toward a compromise or situation in which the conflict, if not entirely obviated, is subjected to institutional regulation, as by the partial or complete restriction of each term to its own "plane." [20] But where the objectification process has proceeded in an especially radical and uncompromising direction in response to a single or unified constellation of sentiments, such conflicts seem most likely to become acute.

Now it is in precisely such a radical direction that we have seen the complex of values and beliefs associated with the witnesses' concept of "the world" to have developed. This complex has doubtless developed in response to and in conformity with personal "needs"; but conformity to certain of its more radical implications the witness can only achieve at the price of frustration of other sentiments which he is unable or unwilling entirely to abandon. A striking example of this is the situation with respect to unbelieving relatives. On the one hand, as we have seen,

[20] The obscuring of value conflicts through their confinement to different planes is emphasized by G. Myrdal (An American Dilemma, New York, 1944).

a complete disregard for them is sanctioned or even recommended; the Christian need not, even ought not to, protect against attack or support such mere "relatives after the flesh" who are enemies of the Theocracy; yet, given the affectional relationships nurtured by the family system of the larger society into which he was born, such renunciation and conformity with the recommendation of concentrating affection on one's relatives "in the family relationship of the family of God" is not to be achieved always without a sense of frustration and personal tragedy. In the face of such frustrations discussions of these questions by the witnesses show a tendency toward certain uncertainties, disagreements, and the introduction of additional principles having the effect of "softening the impact." Thus, scriptures are quoted indicating that unbelieving spouses and children are "sanctified" by their believing relatives; or comfort is sought in the assertion that a relative, though he has taken no definite stand for the Kingdom, appears to be a "person of good will" who will probably eventually come to see the issue more clearly while there is yet time; or uncertainties on the question are made more endurable with the suggestion that, whatever the outcome, we may trust the Lord to see to it that it is for the best; or it is suggested that, where an unbeliever is part of a man's household, a brother should or may defend him for the same reason that he has a right to defend his property, all the latter being, along with himself, consecrated to the Lord. Since, perhaps because irrelevant to the all-important work of witnessing, the leadership largely ignores these conflicts and offers the rank and file no clear orientation to them, the individual's difficulties are heightened by his being largely left to solve them as best he may by himself or with informal aid from his brethren.

Less sharp in its impact on the individual but perhaps more important to the group as a group is the situation resulting from the fact — as we have seen — of the ambiguous or ambivalent attitudes of many outsiders toward the witnesses. Certain of their official formulations — such as "He who is not for me is against me" — are radically uncompromising. However, the witnesses are too strongly constrained to react to these outsiders with an ambivalence of their own to be able in practice thus to put all outsiders "in the same boat." For example, Judge Rutherford had

this to say of certain Protestant ministers who had expressed sympathy and respect for the witnesses in their fight against persecution:

"Deep appreciation is here expressed for the kind and sympathetic words published by the foregoing ministers. . . . It is gratifying to see that there are still some Protestant ministers in the land who are willing to express themselves as against the denial of the rights guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land to the citizens. In all kindness it must here be said that those ministers, however, fail to see the real issue. . . . While it is right and proper that they should protest against violence and the destruction of liberty, it is of paramount importance that they see the great issue and know that it is a fight of the Devil against God and his kingdom, and that the kingdom for which Jesus taught his people to pray is now here and only those who take their stand on the side of the Kingdom shall be saved." [21]

In other contexts, the same type of clergyman is attacked for his "higher" criticism. Again, the reaction is somewhat confused and conflicting with respect to persons showing palpable, but not great, interest in the message, or persons occasionally attending meetings but otherwise displaying only slight enthusiasm for the movement. The practical demand felt by the missionary that he not expect too abrupt a conversion but persist in his efforts discourages a hasty application of the radical principle "He who is not for me is against me." Depending on the exigencies of the situation, this principle, and the consequent abandonment of effort, is applied anywhere from immediately after the first contact to virtually never.

What we may call a "spirit of practical realism" — expressed in the recommendation to be "wise as serpents and harmless as doves" (Matt. 10:16) and to cultivate "the spirit of a sound mind" (2 Tim. 1:7) — is invoked to ease the conscience where the inclination is felt toward radical conclusions which would entail frustrations or even place in jeopardy other values derived from that same official theology itself. Thus, brethren are urged

[21] 1941 Yearbook of Jehovah's Witnesses (Brooklyn, 1940), 43, 44. Here, as elsewhere in this discussion, the important point is the expression of two opposed attitude trends. Whether a formulation achieves a logically consistent compromise is a question pertaining not to the existence of a conflict but to the manner in which the conflict works itself out in practice.

to be wary of witnessing to close neighbors or fellow employees lest, in their extremity of zeal, they end by having to lose many hours in the field through the necessity of having to seek a new residence or job. Munitions workers, bartenders, and others disturbed by what seems to them the particularly "worldly" nature of their employment seek comfort — often without complete success — in the reflection that, whether one likes it or not, witnesses are at the moment "in the world, if not of the world," that they must earn a living somehow, that, given the interdependence of modern industry, it is impossible to engage in work totally without bearing on a nation's war effort, or that, while such jobs and the consequent contamination with the world are undesirable and unpleasant, they must be accepted as unavoidable so long as they do not involve clear violation of one's covenant.

As the simplest way of avoiding embarrassments brethren are urged to keep away from parades or theatres where they might be expected to salute the flag or stand during the national anthem. Children regularly attempt to be as inconspicuous as possible in their nonparticipation in flag-saluting, as by standing without raising the hand and by reciting the "Lord's Prayer" in place of the pledge; and the following pledge has been proposed as an acceptable alternative:

"I have pledged my unqualified allegiance and devotion to Jehovah, the Almighty God, and to His Kingdom, for which Jesus commands all Christians to pray.

"I respect the flag of the United States and acknowledge it as a symbol of freedom and justice to all.

"I pledge allegiance and obedience to all the laws of the United States that are consistent with God's law, as set forth in the Bible." [22]

But the more radical tendencies are opposed by more than mere considerations of expediency. "Respect" for the flag is expressed; and there can be no question of insincerity here; for when Judge Rutherford once during a speech insisted brethren were wrong who treated the flag as a mere rag and continued with the remark that, "Jehovah's witnesses love their flag," he was met with wild applause.

[22] The Watchtower, Feb. 15, 1941, p. 60.

Though it is significant of the conflict they feel that they at times show a curious tendency to impute to themselves ulterior motives,[23] they show, in fact, signs of considerable disinterested concern for a number of values which would appear to be relevant only to what at the same time they view as a "worldly" context. Certain of the formulations about the world may have struck the reader as placing its entire content in the same category; yet we find that in practice some worldly things are far more consistently and bitterly attacked than others, e.g., Catholicism more than Protestantism; Fascist and Fascist-like regimes more than others, especially democratic governments; the Axis Powers in World War II more than the Allies, commercial or "Big Business" interests more than "the people"; persons and groups thought of as "oppressors" or "persecutors" more than the "oppressed," with whom witnesses doubtless feel a bond of identification. Very commonly they attack one worldly group, such as the Rebels in the recent Spanish Civil War, for its wicked behavior toward another, as the Spanish Loyalists, in a manner suggestive of definite sympathy, even admiration, for the latter. But, here again, we find the characteristic note of aloof and often amused cynicism running through such discussions; their adherence to their norm of "neutrality" is thus reflected, as also in their refusal to participate in remedial action and the fact that the "innocent" party of one context often becomes the attacked party of another; [24] the trend is toward the attitude, "What more can you expect of a depraved and dying world?"

Asceticism

Perhaps to be expected from the witnesses since so often associated with a high intensity of religious sentiment in general and a "rejection of the world" in particular is the placing of great emphasis on ascetic virtues. Actually, however, concern

[23] Thus, in answer to the question, Why do Jehovah's witnesses warn people against "the conspiracy against democracy" when the latter is shortly to be destroyed at Armageddon, it is urged that democracy affords them more liberty to preach than do other regimes, and that by calling the conspiracy to the attention of the people it is possible to reveal to them who their real enemies are.

[24] Thus, from an article entitled "The Death of Poland" (Consolation, Dec. 13, 1939): "There are not many who love justice who are grieved when a burglar gets hijacked, even though all decent people despise Hitler, the international hijacker."

over such matters is viewed with definite suspicion as a distraction from witnessing — as, incidentally, is concern with questions of personal morality generally; this attitude reflects also the group's characteristic individualism, the weakness within it of social pressure upon individuals, and its general disinterest in social reform. But at the same time a trend toward asceticism is not entirely lacking, especially where the enjoyment of pleasure runs counter to the "monastic" tendency. Pleasures thus involving social relations or activities with outsiders are felt to involve a "contamination" with the world; perhaps it is as if they offered competition for the individual's attention with internal ones. Brethren are thus urged to avoid stepping outside the Lord's organization to seek the entertainment provided by the Devil's world at motion picture houses and similar resorts; and it is urged, and some seem to feel, that one can have a pleasanter time with one's brethren out in the field or meeting with them in their homes. However, in spite of such reflections, the witnesses by and large do not very rigorously avoid such entertainments.

In striking contrast, however, we find that the group's pronouncements against the use of tobacco are very generally observed. Why this should be so, considering the especial apparent weakness of the social pressure supporting the prohibition,[25] is not altogether clear. Here, where social relations with outsiders are not at issue, we find in purer form another motive, which also plays a part in their other ascetic renunciations. Certain — though not all [26]— forms of sensual indulgence have been seized upon by the group for disapproval as used by the Lord's people; the indications are — as most obviously and at a most conscious level, when specifically called "worldly" — that these practices are symbolic of "the world"; or, alternatively, it may be said that they are identified with the world; or, perhaps best, that they are additional symbols of the same set of further entities of which the world category itself, and its content, are symbolic. Having

[25] Thus, in this and similar connections, it is often said that "it isn't wrong — we just don't do it, that's all," and that the Lord is mindful of the fact that his children have many "weaknesses of the flesh" not easy for them to control.

[26] Although the rank-and-file show some disposition to be suspicious of it, Judge Rutherford specifically advised that the Bible tolerates, even recommends, moderate indulgence in wines. (Consolation, May 28, 1941, p. 16).

a strong odor — a "stink" is a term witnesses use — as also an association with dirt in the form of ashes, yellow stains, etc., tobacco smoke is perhaps especially well adapted to play the rôle of a symbol of the evilness of the world in its special aspect as something "filthy," "disgusting," "unclean," "contaminating," etc.; as various phenomena in the field of interracial contacts well show, reactions to odors largely depend on the contexts in which they are encountered, and on the meanings they are given by a culture. Further support for the tabu is found in the argument that tobacco is one of the means used by the Devil to impair man's health, thus reducing their efficiency in the service of the Lord.

The group is but little preoccupied with questions of sexual morality, with only rather slight tendencies toward "prudery." Marriage with outsiders is, of course, actively discouraged — for this involves an especially strong tie. It is also urged that, while far less objectionable, marriage within the group is better postponed until after Armageddon, as family incumbrances cannot but distract from the Kingdom service, and make the approaching time of trouble even harder to endure. In short, the advice of the Apostle Paul is followed. Marriage ceremonies — sometimes performed by other brethren — are devalued as unnecessary to make the union more binding in the Lord's eyes than a mere agreement between the parties to the arrangement, and the union established in this way must not be dissolved; but marraige ceremonies are accepted as a practically necessary and harmless conformity with the laws of the worldly powers.

III. The Content of "The World" and the Basis of its Unity

It now remains to consider as a problem in the sociology of knowledge the category of the world which the witnesses have developed and use. Up to this point I have repeatedly used such phrases as "attitudes toward the world" as if the referent of the term "world" were clear — as if it were clear towards *what* the attitudes were entertained. This is not strictly true, however; hence at times I have used such alternative formulations as "things included in the world."

We must now consider what these things are. In speaking of a

"conception of the world" and the like we must avoid the unwarranted assumption that the term "the world" uniformly refers to some fixed and known entity, the same for all groups and cultures, of which varying conceptions are entertained; [27] for this reason the admittedly clumsy expression "world category" or "world concept" is to be preferred to "conception of the world." We may also ask why the witnesses should have such a concept at all; for not all men have such a one, or entertain it as vividly, so that it plays as important a rôle in their thinking.

The treatment to this point suggests a rough correspondence between "the world" or "the things included in the world" and "everything outside the witnesses' own group." However, the "overtones" — the suggested complexes of sentiments and "meanings" — are emphatically quite different in the case of these two expressions — even if, in denotation as contrasted with connotation, they may closely correspond; the "attitudes toward the world" are not merely, though they are in large part, "out-group" sentiments. But the discussion of the preceding pages shows that there are many further complications. Thus, the witnesses affirm that they are "in the world," though not "of the world"; and recalcitrant brethren are reproached with the reminder that they have failed to disassociate themselves sufficiently from the world. Such formulations suggest that the correspondence between "things outside the group' and "the world" is not simple, though they are consistent with an *identification* of the two according to which it is still possible for a person in practice to be partly of the world and partly of their own group. Yet at the same time, we find them saying, "He who is not for me is against me." A more serious complication derives from the heterogeneity in the sentiments of which things outside the group are the objects; we have found that certain things are condemned more actively than others, some are the objects of strongly ambivalent attitudes, some are the objects of predominantly friendly attitudes, even in some instances being put in what amounts to the special category of "persons of good will." Finally, the things

[27] That there is such a persisting entity, to which the various conceptions of the world are varying reactions, is a plausible view; but the view should be defended by argument, not merely taken for granted with no demonstration.

included in or otherwise identified with the world at first glance seem rather heterogeneous; political, commercial, and religious organizations, certain supernatural beings, various forms of entertainment, smoking, practices like voting, flag-saluting, participation in war, vaccination etc. If, then, there is an ambiguity in the status of certain entities as belonging or not belonging to the world, if the entities placed in the category, or which are at least disassociated from the witnesses' own group, are the objects of widely varying sentiments, and if, finally, these entities are heterogeneous, the questions arise: What is the basis of the sense which the witnesses presumably have — since they place them in this *single* category — of the unity among the things placed in the category, and why do they conceptualize their experience in terms of it?

The term "world" as actually used by the witnesses, carries a reference to various sentiments, including value elements, felt as qualities inhering in objects; these qualities we may view as projections onto the objects of the sentiments cathecting them.[28] These qualities which the word connotes, as contrasted with the substantival objects it denotes, are especially emphasized by the adjective "worldly." These sentiments, of which we conceive the qualities to be the projections, are roughly, we may say, the hostile ones involved in the ambivalent constellations we have described. However great the variation from instance to instance both qualitatively and quantitatively, there is a recognizable thread of continuity in the sentiments of which the things in the world are the objects; they regularly involve elements of the order of "hostility," "rejection," "moral condemnation," etc. It is precisely these common elements in the sentiments entertained towards them that bind the things in the world into what is felt as a unity — that bring it about that they are all felt, however different they may be otherwise, to have certain qualities in common.[29] The unity itself is also felt to share these qualities

[28] Herein lies another reason why it can put us off the track to speak of "attitudes *toward* the world," this formulation failing to do justice to the intimacy of the relation between the word and the attitudes as integral parts of the word's meaning.

[29] In a context in which the opposite of hostile attitudes are being emphasized, such status as a thing may usually be given as a part of the world is not emphasized. To describe a thing as "part of the world" or "worldly" is to condemn it.

and is the object of these sentiment-elements, although the concrete attitudes toward it may not exactly correspond to that toward any one of its constituents — "the whole is more than the sum of its parts." A thing is included in the world insofar as attitudes towards the thing are congruent with those toward the unity; and the attitudes toward the unity — and consequently the qualities imputed to it — may be viewed as a kind of resultant of the attitudes toward the individual things in the world. It thus follows that the attitudes toward the unity and the content of the unity are mutually dependent. Through such interaction the elaborate Gestalt arises. Neither the connotation nor the denotation of the term "world" as used by the witnesses — as also with most substantival concepts in popular use — may be viewed as "primary."

Let us try to reach a closer comprehension of the situation by seeing how the witnesses themselves view it. At the most official level the concept implies, is an integral part of, a definite *theory* of certain natural and supernatural entities and their interrelations:

"What is meant . . . by the term 'the world'? The people and nations of earth that are under the influence of demons, of which Satan the Devil is the prince or chief of demons, constitute the world that lies in the wicked one. (1 John 5:19, *Diaglott*) The world is made up chiefly of three ruling elements, to wit: religion, politics, and commerce. . . . The world, therefore, consists of the organization of the peoples of earth into forms of government which are dominated by the power and influence of the invisible overlord, Satan. The new world will consist of all people who survive Armageddon, and who love righteousness and hate wickedness, and such will live on the earth under the supervision and control of the invisible, righteous overlord, Christ the King. Thus it is seen that all people and all nations must now be separated or divided into two classes, that those who love righteousness and who serve righteousness shall live, and that those who choose wickedness shall be destroyed." [30]

While many worldly things may be objects of ambivalent sentiments, the world itself is not, at least in the same way; and if found to be so with some individuals, as is not unlikely, such a situation ought probably to be viewed as a different order of phenomenon from the ambivalences we have discussed, but rather implying a current of revolt against submission to the group.

[30] J. F. Rutherford, Children (Brooklyn, 1941), p. 241 f.

Though resembling a mere taxonomic class in that the things it contains have something in common — in this case, the fact of being cathected by recognizably similar attitudes — the nature of the unity which "the world" is felt to have is somewhat different. It is less a class into which things are *put* than an entity with which, at an emotional or feeling level, things are *identified*, somewhat as a symbol is identified with the thing it symbolizes. Further, as generally with "Gestalten," its unity derives as much from the relations between its parts as from their common characteristics. It is an organized, corporate, quasi-social kind of unity which it is felt to have, not unlike that which an outside observer imputes to an organized social group, though not quite of the kind for the world to be thought of as exactly a corporate personality.

An essential implication of the world concept is the feeling of *contrast*. Our quotation contains a theory of another "world" — the "new world" — comparable to "the world" proper, but standing in radical opposition to it. There is a correspondence — though, as we have seen, not an identity — between these two "worlds" and, respectively, the witnesses' own group and everything outside thereof, i.e., the established social order or "larger society." Similarly, the sense of opposition between the two worlds corresponds, though it is not identical, with the witnesses' hostility-tinged feeling for the contrast between his own group and outsiders. The two worlds we may consider as at least partly "expansions" of the more "natural" entities to which they correspond into concepts of elaborate entities embodying also supernatural personalities. These expansions are presumably more nicely attuned to the adequate expression and symbolization of the relevant sentiments than would be the case in the absence of the expansion. At the same time as the direction taken by the expansion process is determined by the character of the sentiments, it also crystallizes and canalizes these sentiments themselves. Instead of the contrast being phrased as one between the witnesses' own small group and everyone else — a phrasing which would seem not lacking in absurdity and "conceit" — the conception is the more dramatic one of two vast, universe-embracing and mighty organizations, each with its supernatural controlling

power, but with the two human groups constituting in a sense the nuclei. The witnesses identify themselves with "the new world"; outsiders, especially insofar as the attitude happens to be one of some kind of hostility or rejection, are identified with the other entity, "the world."

This notion of *contrast* we find repeatedly implied in contexts involving the world concept. Thus, "worldly" authorities are contrasted with the Bible; the "worldly employment" of brethren is contrasted with the life of a pioneer in full-time Kingdom service; attendance at motion picture theatres and the like are described as a stepping outside of the Lord's organization and into the world, and such worldly pleasures are contrasted with the joys of serving the Lord on witnessing expeditions. In fact, applying a procedure analogous to a Paretian residue-derivation analysis, we may recognize in the witnesses a tendency to organize their experience in terms of dichotomies of contrasting "principles," of which tendency the two contrasting "worlds" constitute but a single manifestation. As is adequately attested by the wide use of such categories as those of "good" and "evil," this tendency is not a monopoly of the witnesses and others resembling them; the most that can be said is that it is especially strong with them and assumes with them special peculiarities. Each set of contrasting concepts differs from the others in emphasis and in the contexts to which it is appropriate. Thus, where the emphasis is on individuals, especially as they reveal themselves by their reaction to the Kingdom message, we have the contrast between "goats" and "sheep," "persons of good will," or "Jonadabs"; or between "religionists" or "Devil-worshippers" and "persons devoted to the truth" or "followers of Christ Jesus." Where the emphasis is on systems of belief and practice, we have the important contrast between "religion" [31] and the "truth," closely associated with which is the characteristic contrast between the "word," "teachings," or "authority" of God and those of "imperfect men."

Most similar to the contrast between the two worlds is that

[31] It is interesting to note that this usage is the opposite of the more common one where there is also a value-reference, in that the reference is negative, not positive. This forcibly emphasizes the contrast; the witnesses' faith is presented as so different from others that, rather than "true religion" — the common phrase — it is not religion at all.

between "Satan's organization" and "Jehovah's organization." Implied here is the contrast between the two great mutually-striving supernatural personalities who symbolize, embody, personify, the sentiments and values lying behind all these contrasts, including that of the two worlds. As the embodiment or projection of the super-egos of the witnesses — whose content is in turn determined by group factors — Jehovah is the embodiment of all the group's ideals, is the being they feel they serve, who issues the commands, and for whom they pursue these ideals. Both he and the Devil symbolize the group's values — the former its positive, the latter its negative. The latter embodies all that the group abhores and morally rejects and against which it makes its protests and feels hostility.[32] He is the agent made responsible, directly or indirectly but always ultimately, for everything in their experience falling short of conformity with their desires [33] and ideals, — as God's Kingdom will not fall short; he — together with "the world," etc. — is the object of those aggressions which are consequent upon frustrations. Of these frustrations we may broadly distinguish the following classes: those deriving from the failure of national and international society at large to conform with human aspirations — the prevalence of poverty, war, etc.; the personal frustrations to which all men are subject in greater or less degree — experiences with illness, death, economic failure, disappointments in social relations, etc.; frustrations bound up with the group activities of the witnesses and thus peculiar to them, such as those associated with persecution, rebuffs experienced in witnessing, and the like. It is in terms of their theory of the great struggle between the two mighty supernatural beings and their respective "worlds" that the witnesses offer their solution to the problem of evil and explain the "meaning" or the "why" of these frustrations.[34]

[32] Preëminent among these protests, as I attempt to show elsewhere (see notes 3 and 18) is that against authority, especially, though not exclusively, officially-constituted, human — in their own terms, "worldly" — authority.

[33] The observance of divinely-appointed duties often involves sacrifice of personal inclinations; but the latter are viewed as "weaknesses of the flesh" characteristic of life under the regime of the Devil, and destined to be removed as human creatures become "perfected" under the Kingdom. These frustrations are thus also blamed on the Devil.

[34] On the rôle of religion in providing answers to questions as to the "meaning" of frustrations, see T. Parsons, The Structure of Social Action, (New York, 1937), 565 ff.

AUGUSTINE AND THE CRITICAL METHOD

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The following study is an analysis of Augustine's exegetical method with especial reference to an assessment of its critical element. The object is to find out what kind of argument the Bishop of Hippo used in his expositions of Scripture, and to pass judgment on it in terms of the canons of modern critical method. There is obviously an immense difference between what we on the one hand and what St. Augustine on the other would call a "good" argument. It seems to me profitable to inquire into this difference.

Without attempting to offer a definition of critical method, it will be agreed, I think, that a critical approach is free from the personality of the one who applies it and is based upon evidence drawn from the text or its context. As applied to Scripture a critical method will endeavor to ascertain and explain the meaning of the Biblical text in these terms. It might be contrasted with an exegetical method which elicits meaning on the basis of authority, faith, wishful thinking, convenience, or some other circumstance unrelated to the passage in hand. One approach establishes meaning from within the text, the other from outside it.

By inquiring into the nature of Augustine's exegetical method, therefore, we are immediately and necessarily led to inquire into his conception of the meaning of the texts he expounded. Indeed that is the primary question. Consequently we shall endeavor below to discover as precisely as possible what Augustine had in mind when he asserted that a Biblical passage had this or that meaning. By what methods did he arrive at his conclusion? To what degree will his conception of the meaning of meaning bear careful scrutiny? Did he, in fact, make any distinction at all between the meaning of a passage and the meaning he read into it?

These are all, it seems to me, important questions; necessary

not only to an understanding of Augustine himself, and his methods, but also, more significantly, to the history of the evolution of our own notions of critical method. Yet in all the immense body of modern literature devoted to Augustine and to his exegesis I do not find that these questions have been asked. Grabmann is mainly concerned with what he calls the external forms of Augustine's methods and does not discuss his conception of meaning.[1] When he comes to his account of the genesis of the sic-et-non method,[2] he refers to Augustine only once, and that in a negative fashion, to point out that Augustine's method was not like this. There are those who have, indeed, raised the question of meaning, but not in the sense or with the purpose described above; they have concerned themselves with Augustine's use of allegory. For the most part they have been content to deplore an exaggerated devotion to figurative interpretations.[3] But there is much more to the subject than an insufficient attention to the literal approach. An allegorical meaning, for instance, may be demonstrably the meaning of the text. Also, though this fact has been neglected, allegory was used not only as a method of elaborating meaning for purposes of edification, but also as an argument. We will discuss these matters in more detail below.

The stimulus that impelled Augustine to the elaboration of exegetical methods, insofar as they relate to our interests, was his belief in and defense of Scriptural inspiration, truth and consistency. (The fact that similar stimuli had produced similar methods before does not concern us here. We are interested not in the sources, Christian or otherwise, of Augustine's methods, but in an analysis of the methods themselves and their significance for later periods.) The Bible was the work of God, contained no error, and all the texts in the Bible were wholly in harmony both with all other Scriptural texts and with the principles of the Christian faith. While this was true, it was also undeniably

[1] Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode, 2 vol. (Freiburg, 1909–1911), vol. 1, pp. 137–143.

[2] Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 234–246; vol. 2, pp. 199–212.

[3] E. Portalié, "Augustin (Saint)," Dict. de théol. cath., vol. 1, pt. 2, cols. 2341–2344; O. Bardenhewer, Geschichte der altkirchlichen Literatur, vol. 4 (Freiburg, 1924), pp. 428–430 and 480–490; J. R. Smith, "Augustine as an Exegete," Bibliotheca Sacra, vol. 61 (1904), pp. 318–344; Henry Preserved Smith, Essays in Biblical Interpretation (Boston, 1921), chap. 3, "The Triumph of Allegory."

true that there were apparent errors and seeming inconsistencies in Holy Writ. It was therefore necessary for Augustine to elaborate and apply certain concordance methods in order to demonstrate that the apparent lack of harmony was only apparent, that the essential unity and fundamental agreement of the authority was unimpaired. We may now examine the techniques by means of which Augustine accomplished this demonstration.

A framework for an analysis of these techniques may conveniently be provided by two passages in which Augustine states what is to be done when something "absurd" appears in Scripture. By things that are "absurd" he means apparent inconsistencies either between two texts in the Bible or between a text and the recognized principles of Christian truth.

In one passage he says,[4] "If in the words of God or of any person raised to the office of prophecy something is said which, taken literally, can only be understood as absurd, doubtless it ought to be taken figuratively as a sign of something." In other words the contradiction is to be solved by interpreting the difficult passage allegorically.

In the second passage Augustine writes,[5] "If something absurd comes up in Scripture, it is not permitted to say the author of this book is wrong: but either the codex is faulty, or the translation bad, or you yourself do not understand." In this case Augustine would seem prepared to use techniques based on evidence obtainable from the text alone, without recourse to allegory.

The modern reader, considering these two passages, will be inclined to conclude that Augustine distinguished sharply between techniques that were allegorical and techniques that were not. It will shortly become evident, however, that Augustine himself made no such clear distinction. Limitations imposed on us by language and the habits of thought of centuries lead us to separate most carefully the one from the other. Augustine was

[4] De Genesi ad litteram, xi, 1. J. P. Migne, Patrologia cursus completus series latina, vol. xxxiv, col. 430. Migne's Latin Patrology will hereafter be abbreviated "PL." The Greek Patrology will be "PG." The Viennese Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum will be cited "CSEL."

[5] Contra Faustum, xi, 5. PL xlii, 249.

not subject to these limitations. But, as a matter of convenience, let us discuss these methods as if they were distinct, considering the allegorical first; in the course of that discussion the manner in which the two merged will become apparent.

Allegory was used not simply as a literary device to draw the last iota of moral meaning from a text in order to further the edification of the reader. It was also clearly and consciously used as a technique of criticism, as an argument to demonstrate a point. This seems to me a remarkable fact, but one that, as far as I know, has not been noticed by historians of Biblical criticism.[6]

In the De doctrina christiana Augustine gives the rule by which a reader of Scripture is to know when a passage is literal and when it is figurative: [7] "This is the general rule, that whatever in the Bible does not, taken literally, support excellence of conduct or the truth of the faith, that you are to recognize as an allegory." It is interesting that Augustine was perfectly aware of the weakness of this principle as a general rule; he realized that men would take figuratively anything opposed to their own customs or opposed to their own (perhaps erroneous) opinions.[8] But this only leads the greatest of the Latin fathers to assert the more strongly that there is a true standard.

Augustine is quite explicit in the De doctrina christiana as to the cases in which the general rule is to be applied for the solution of problems of contradiction. Thus, apparently sinful sayings or actions attributed to God or to holy men are to be taken figuratively.[9] Similarly, a command that enjoins crime or vice or forbids an act of prudence or benevolence is figurative.[10]

[6] The history of allegory as a technique of edification has been extensively investigated. The following monographs, which consider the subject with more or less specialized emphasis, are but a small part of an immense literature: Carl Siegfried, Philo von Alexandria als Ausleger des Alten Testaments (Jena, 1875); Heinrich Kihn, Theodor von Mopsuestia und Junilius Africanus als Exegeten (Freiburg, 1880); F. W. Farrar, History of Interpretation (Bampton Lectures, 1885); F. Prat, Origène, le théologien et l'exégète (Paris, 1907); Louis Pirot, L'Oeuvre exégètique de Théodore de Mopsueste (Rome, 1913); W. Bousset, Judisch-christliche Schulbetrieb in Alexandrien und Rom (Göttingen, 1915); A. de la Barre, "Ecole chrétienne de l'Alexandrie," Dict. de théol. cath.; Bardenhewer, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 7 ff.; H. P. Smith, op. cit.

[7] De doc. christ., iii, 10, 14. PL xxxiv, 71.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid., iii, 12, 18. PL xxxiv, 72–73.

[10] Ibid., iii, 16, 24. PL xxxiv, 74.

The use of allegory as a method in these passages is clear. The essential point is that the problem is one of maintaining, in terms of an inner meaning, the harmony of Scriptural authority. Activities and statements that seem sinful in the Bible upset its unity since they stand in contradiction to Christian standards, with which Holy Writ must, of course, be in perfect accord. Allegory is used by Augustine as a concordance technique to demonstrate that the contradiction is only apparent, not real.

Allegory was not by any means the only approach to problems of inconsistency in Scripture; there were many others. Of these the most obvious are purely grammatical. Thus Augustine points out that a proper punctuation will solve certain ambiguities in the Bible.[11] Similarly correct pronunciation will often clear up difficulties.[12] Knowledge of word forms is also very useful; for example, in such cases as deciding whether the word *os* is derived from *ossa* or *ora*.[13] These techniques would be ready in the hands of any student of the elementary principles of grammar. Their application to Biblical problems does not, of course, necessarily involve questions of inconsistency or inner meaning.

Another obvious and simple technique was used extensively by Augustine in demonstrating the harmony of the Gospel stories. Thus, he states that there is no contradiction if it can be shown that one evangelist omits what another describes,[14] although a superficial reading of the related passages may give an appearance of contradiction. The rather extraordinary corollary is also developed, that the writers of the Gospels sometimes describe similar or even identical events which took place twice.[15] This technique solves the problem, but it does little more than that. Except that it obtains the desired result it is highly unsatisfactory, and, in fact, contributes nothing to the development of the methods in which we are interested.[16]

[11] Ibid., iii, 2, 2. PL xxxiv, 65.
[12] Ibid., iii, 3, 6. PL xxxiv, 67.
[13] Ibid., iii, 3, 7. PL xxxiv, 68.
[14] De cons. evang., ii, 5, 16. CSEL xliii, 98.
[15] Ibid., ii, 19, 45. CSEL xliii, 145.
[16] These remarks, of course, apply to the technique when the argument rests solely on the mere statement of duality or omission. When the argument is more fully developed and textual evidence is produced to demonstrate duality or omission, the technique will be seen to fall under one of the classifications discussed below.

We come finally to those techniques which are most important for our investigation. These are the ones that are (apparently) non-allegorical, and are connected with Augustine's statement, quoted above, that anything "absurd" in Scripture is the result of a faulty codex, a poor translation, or a weakness in the understanding of the exegete. On one occasion Augustine expresses the opinion that there are very few difficulties in the literal words of Scripture that cannot be solved by an application of this class of techniques.[17] He seems to dissociate from these methods any resort to allegory. He seems to be stating that as far as the literal text of the Bible goes, there are very few problems that cannot be solved by evidence derived solely from the text.

Certainly these methods can be presented that way — without a trace of allegory; and it will be convenient to consider them first without this complication. They fall into two general categories: some depend on an analysis of the meaning of the writer in terms of the circumstances of time, place, context, purpose, etc.; others depend on a collation of codices or a knowledge of original languages. Augustine offers a number of general explicit enunciations of these various techniques. We may take them from their contexts and arrange them in an arbitrary order for our own convenience.

1. "Careful attention is to be given to what concerns time, and place and person." [18]

2. "In understanding the exactnesses of Scripture, we should know that some things are commanded generally, others to individuals or certain classes of people." [19]

3. "There are words which do not have one signification, but properly used in different contexts are understood in a different way." [20]

4. "I doubt not at all that when some diversity is found in two codices, and both cannot be true, the right thing to do is to trust the language from which the translation was made." [21]

These four general principles, extracted thus from their contexts

[17] De doc. christ., iii, 4, 8. PL xxxiv, 68.
[18] Ibid., iii, 12, 19. PL xxxiv, 73.
[19] Ibid., iii, 17, 25. PL xxxiv, 75.
[20] De cons. evang., ii, 30, 72. CSEL xliii, 176.
[21] De civ. Dei, xv, 13. PL xli, 454.

and collected in one place, constitute a remarkable series. They embrace with considerable verbal exactness the methods for which the Sic et Non has acquired fame, a fact which writers on Abelard have almost entirely neglected.[22] They establish clearly the basis for the use of those techniques without which the work of Gratian and of Peter Lombard would have been impossible. Viewed thus by themselves, the methods here set forth by Augustine appear to open the way to a critical analysis of the text that is "controlled" in the same sense that an argument in geometry is controlled or a demonstration in physics. The exercise of these principles applied to any specific problem should lead to one and only one conclusion; and, assuming the technique is properly applied, that conclusion should be necessary and incontrovertible. If we can take these four statements as truly and fully representative of Augustine's thought on the subject, we have found in the fifth century a sound appreciation of modern critical method.

But, in fact, we cannot take them so. Specific arguments made by Augustine on the basis of these principles are not controlled as are the arguments of a geometrician. In his mind they do not, apparently, lead to one and only one conclusion. The verbal connection between these sentences and modern statements of the principles of critical analysis is close; but the practical use of the methods is not at all the same. It is now our business to discover as precisely as possible what Augustine meant in the sentences quoted.

The essential point for understanding Augustine's use of these techniques is recognition of the fact that for him an argument dependent on an inner or allegorical meeting established outside the limits of the text was just as valid as an argument derived solely from the evidence of the text itself. It is not necessary to understand at this point exactly what Augustine meant by "literal" and what he meant by "allegorical." [23] For either of these inter-

[22] Grabmann, op cit., vol. 2, pp. 199–213, refers only to the third of these statements and briefly dismisses its importance on the ground that it is applied allegorically. Quite aside from his neglect of the other three principles, this reference is itself insufficient, as we shall see below. Augustine quite certainly used the method in a non-allegorical as well as an allegorical fashion.

[23] It should be remembered that for Augustine, as for the whole ancient and

pretations might quite properly be established solely in terms of evidence provided by the text. The point is to distinguish an argument based on that sort of evidence from an argument based on evidence of faith or some other circumstance outside the limits of the document.

Augustine did not distinguish the validity of these two kinds of argument. One was, for him, as good as the other. The two merged; they could be used interchangeably, or both together. And, paradoxically, it was because of this fact that he was able to elaborate and apply techniques concerned solely with the evidence provided by the text. He had always a way out, an alternative solution: hence he could afford the luxury of a controlled argument. In case it led to an unacceptable conclusion, it was only the conclusion and not the method that he need reject.

This characteristic of Augustine's thinking was common to the other Fathers; but it is clearer in Augustine and the elements of the two kinds of argument are more highly developed in his writings. This can be explained in part by the peculiarities of his personality. How necessary it was for him to have an alternative solution, if I may put it that way, is apparent in the Confessions. His conversion to Christianity was long-delayed partly because of the difficulties presented to his sensitive mind, with its Manichean training, by the apparent crudities of the Old Testament. He tells in the Confessions of hearing Ambrose, the eloquent preacher, expound the text "The letter killeth but the

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medieval world, the literal meaning of a passage was a much more restricted thing than it is for the modern world. Phrases that we would consider literal, like "downcast eyes" or "my thoughts ran" were not so considered in the period we are studying. See the excellent article, "Der geistige Sinn der Heilige Schrift beim hl. Augustinus" by L. Hugo in the Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, vol. xxxii (1908). It is this fact that explains Origen's frequently misunderstood statement that many texts in the Bible have no literal meaning at all. At a later point in this investigation we shall have to try to decide to what extent Augustine's methods may be called controlled when he is dealing with allegorical concepts that are clearly established by usage or the intention of the writer. There is no question about the meaning of the phrase "blind ditch" to signify a ditch we are blind to, as Augustine himself points out (De Genesi contra Manichaeos, i, 34. PL xxxiv, 190), although this is certainly not in the medieval sense its literal meaning. The real difficulty comes, to give an example, when Augustine interprets "staff" to mean "power of domination." But such an interpretation might conceivably be based on usage or intention as consistently as the idiom "blind ditch."

spirit giveth life." It becomes clear, as he tells the story, that he thereafter came to realize the method by which he might retain the integrity of his intellectual training and at the same time accept in full the ancient Scriptures of the Church.[24] That method depended on a satisfactory relation between an argument derived from a text and an argument derived from inner meaning.

Let us consider in more detail each of the four principles quoted above, together with its specific application.

The technique that solves difficulties by considerations of time, place and circumstance was especially useful to Augustine in interpreting the Old Testament. The differences between the Old and the New Testament are not the differences of contraries, he asserts in the De vera religione, but are explicable in terms of the different situations. Divine Providence, like a physician, prescribed different remedies for different ailments (*ita divina providentia . . . pro diversitate morborum alias alia jubet et vetat*).[25] The Mosaic law was valid for one time, under one set of circumstances; the Gospels for another. The two are therefore in no contradiction. Certain moral precepts which were instituted because of the special conditions of the time (*pro temporum proprietatibus institutis*) permitted things which were later forbidden (*inveniemus nunc aliquid non licere quod ante licuerit*) and vice versa (*quod ante non licuerit nunc licere*).[26]

These precepts have no trace of allegory. Instances of their more specific application may easily be found where there is also no resort to an inner meaning. Thus, the fact that Jacob had four wives is not to be called a crime because it was the custom of the time; but now, because it is not the custom, it is a crime.[27]

The same technique could be applied with an allegorical framework such that the argument involved depended not on the text but on an inner meaning. I am unable to discover any distinction Augustine may have made between the two. One was as valid an exercise of the technique as the other. In his arguments against Faustus, he rails against "those who are unable to distinguish

[24] Conf. vi, 4. CSEL xxxiii, 119.
[25] De vera rel., 17. PL xxxiv, 136.
[26] Contra Faustum, xix, 20. PL xlii, 360.
[27] Ibid., xxi, 47. PL xlii, 428.

between the custom of the time of the prophets when the promise was veiled and the custom of the time of the apostles when the promise was revealed."[28] His distinctions of time, place and person here become figurative, and with these figurative distinctions problems can now be solved. He finds solutions as to differences between certain precepts of the Old Testament and the New by arguing that God intended at one time and place that they be taken figuratively, and in another time and place literally.[29] These are not controlled arguments.

In the Contra Faustum, Augustine frequently offers an explanation of difficulties in the Old Testament in both the literal and figurative planes. He demonstrates that a patriarch did not sin in having more than one wife because such practice was at the time quite proper and justifiable in terms of current custom. He then shows as well that the same fact has an allegorical meaning which would, in any case, relieve the patriarch of the charge of sinning. On one interesting occasion Augustine finds that he is unable to justify the action by an argument in both frameworks. He can find no non-allegorical justification for the daughters of Lot lying with their father; the action was not, taken literally, proper to the time, the place or the people. Augustine therefore admits that as a fact of history the action is a crime; but he says, as a text of Scripture it is a prophecy.[30] He concludes by calling attention carefully to the fact that the action is nowhere commended in the Bible.

The second technique quoted above is that of taking into account the purpose of a command, whether it is absolute or aimed at a special class of people. To it may be added the related critical principles of dispensations and other special cases. As Augustine says elsewhere, it is necessary to consider the act, the agent and the authority for the action.[31] For example, it is one thing if Abraham were to sacrifice Isaac of his own volition; it is quite another to prepare to do it at the command of God.[32]

This technique of distinguishing a special purpose or class of

[28] Ibid., xxii, 23. PL xlii, 417.
[29] Ibid., vii, 2. PL xlii, 237.
[30] Ibid., xxii, 42. PL xlii, 426.
[31] Ibid., xxii, 73. PL xlii, 446.
[32] Ibid.

people involved in a command was also exercised by Augustine in a purely figurative manner. The exhortation to offer up thy daughter in Ecclus. 7:27 and the Gospel passage (Matth. 19:12) about castrating oneself for the kingdom of heaven's sake create obvious difficulties as literal programs of action. They are explained by Augustine allegorically, but within the framework of the not-necessarily allegorical principle.[33]

The generally accepted theory that there is a double standard of life for Christians, the active and the contemplative, presumes the principle that commands are not always to be taken absolutely. This is made clear in the De vera religione. But the distinction there between an absolute command and one addressed to special circumstances or individuals is as often allegorical as not.[34]

The only difference that allegory made in the use of this technique was in the conclusion. The application of the method was the same whether the argument depended on inner meaning or not. It was possible to practice the method without involving oneself in its consequences.

We have already indicated above the fact that Augustine applied both grammatically and allegorically the next rule, of distinguishing the meanings of words in different contexts. The idea that one word is used with different significations is, indeed, the fundamental principle of allegory. That it was so used by Augustine to solve problems created by instances of apparent contradiction in the Bible is clear. It is also true that he solved similar problems by distinctions of meaning that were purely grammatical.

The following examples show different types of grammatical distinctions, all of which were used as applications of this technique to problems of seeming contradiction in the authority of the Bible. The word "day" is sometimes used in Scripture in the less strict sense to mean "time."[35] In a discussion of the meaning of the words "jealousy" and "anger" in the Old Testament Augustine shows that they can properly be applied to God:

[33] De doc. christ., iii, 17, 25. PL xxxiv, 75.

[34] See, e.g., De vera rel., 24. PL xxxiv, 141. See also Contra Faustum, xxii, 77. PL xlii, 450.

[35] De cons. evang., ii, 41, 88. CSEL xliii, 191.

Jealousy may refer to the state of mind of a man with an unfaithful wife (in which case it does not apply to God), or to the state of mind of a man who guards conjugal chastity with diligence (and it is in this sense that God is called jealous). Similarly an angry man is not necessarily vindictive.[36] Again the meaning of the word "flesh" in two apparently contradictory passages is different, as you will see, says Augustine "if you hold to the right meaning of the words" (*si te ad verborum proprietatem teneas*).[37] Using the technique in reverse Augustine says that different words may have the same meaning. Thus Mark 5:30, "Who touches my clothes?" and Luke 8:45, "Who touches me?" are not to be taken as opposed to one another. One phrase is literal; the other idiomatic (*Alter enim dixit usitate, alter proprie, eandem tamen uterque sententiam*).[38] It may also be remarked that Augustine composed a work particularly devoted to this subject in which he compiled a list of special grammatical usages in Scripture.[39]

That the allegorical use of this technique is analogous to the grammatical may be indicated in Augustine's own words by his explanation of the unity of meaning behind the changes in the sacraments of the Old and New Testaments. He makes the point that the sacraments are like words which are changeable and temporary. The thing meant by the words and the thing symbolized by the sacrements is what is constant and eternal. Words change, says Augustine, as "do," "done" and "to be done;" and it is the same with the sacraments.[40] Allegory is, then, a kind of language in which the symbols are words and to be handled by rules similar to the rules of grammar.

The clearest statement bringing allegory and grammar together in connection with this technique is made by Augustine in handling a problem in the synoptic Gospels. According to the sixth chapter of Mark, Jesus called the twelve to him and sent them forth two by two "and commanded them that they should take nothing for their journey *save a staff only*." Both Matthew (10:10) and

[36] Contra Faustum, xxii, 18. PL xlii, 410.
[37] Ibid., xi, 7, 8. PL xlii, 249.
[38] De cons. evang., ii, 28, 65. CSEL xliii, 170.
[39] Scripturae sacrae locutiones, PL xxxiv, 485–546.
[40] Contra Faustum, xix, 16. PL xlii, 356–7.

Luke (9:3) in recounting this incident specifically mention staves among the things which the apostles are commanded *not* to take with them. This contradiction, says Augustine, "is thus solved, that the staff which is to be carried according to Mark is to be understood under one signification, and that which is not to be carried according to Matthew and Luke under another, *just as* (*sicut*) we understand under one signification the temptation of which it is said 'God tempts no one' (James 1:13), and under another that of which it is said 'The Lord your God tempteth you' (Deut. 13:3) so that he might know if you love him. The first is of seduction, the second of proof." [41] The two significations of the word staff are clearly allegorical. Just as clearly the two meanings of the word "tempt," i.e., "to seduce" and "to test," are grammatical. The latter can be demonstrated to be the meaning of the text by evidence drawn from the text; the former cannot. Augustine uses the grammatical distinction to illustrate the allegorical one, and announces their similarity explicitly. Yet we would recognize only the grammatical one as a valid exercise of critical method.

Endless examples of this technique used allegorically could be given, of which I will cite only one. There is an apparent opposition between Matth. 16:11, "Beware of the leaven of the Pharisees," and Luke 13:21, "The Kingdom of Heaven is like unto leaven." The solution of the difficulty is based on a figurative distinction of the meaning of the word "leaven" in the different contexts.[42]

We come lastly to Augustine's use of techniques based on his knowledge of languages and the collation of codices. Here, if anywhere, it would seem impossible to mix allegorical and non-allegorical methods. Yet, in fact, they were mixed.

Augustine makes much of the advantage of the knowledge of languages, which in the study of Scripture means Greek and Hebrew, so that the exegete can "go back to the earlier exemplar if the endless variety of Latin translations creates a problem." [43] It is because of the diversities of the Latin translations that

[41] De cons. evang., ii, 30, 71. CSEL xliii, 175–6.
[42] De doc. christ., iii, 25, 35. PL xxxiv, 78.
[43] De doc. christ., ii, 11, 16. PL xxxiv, 42.

knowledge of languages is important.[44] Augustine is very clear about the faults of the Latin texts. Some translations, he says, are "not obscure but false," and these "we must learn not to interpret but to correct."[45] If the exegete himself does not know the necessary languages, he should go to those who do, or at least compare the Latin translations with one another.[46]

These principles, still without intermixture of allegory, Augustine himself practiced as well as he could. He was not a great linguist, knew no Hebrew, and his command of Greek was less than extraordinary. He does, however, compile a list of certain Greek variations from the Latin and of variations between the Latin codices of the Heptateuch.[47] On one occasion in the De consensu evangelistarum, borrowing his information from Jerome, he points out that Matthew in referring to the Virgin with the word "woman" did not imply, as the Latin word would, a matron, for he was speaking according to Hebrew idiom which does not make this distinction.[48]

Another example of Augustine's abilities as a textual critic is his treatment of the curious reading "Jeremiah" in Matth. 27:9. The evangelist attributes the prophecy about the potter's field and the thirty pieces of silver to Jeremiah when, in fact, he is quoting Zechariah. Before Augustine, commentators had generally dismissed this as a scribal error. Augustine argues against this shrewdly and effectively. A careful examination, he says, shows that the older and better Greek exemplars favor the reading "Jeremiah." Furthermore, he points out, it was unlikely that a copyist would substitute an incorrect reference for a correct one. A scribe might have changed a mistaken reading in the process of copying, but it is very doubtful that he would have eliminated a correct one.[49] That the more difficult reading is preferable is one of the canons of modern textual criticism.

But these apparently sound textual principles do not by any means completely describe Augustine's position in this respect.

[44] Ibid., PL xxxiv, 43.
[45] Ibid., ii, 12, 18. PL xxxiv, 44.
[46] Ibid., ii, 14, 21. PL xxxiv, 45.
[47] In Scripturae sacrae locutiones, PL xxxiv, 485–546.
[48] De cons. evang., ii, 28, 68. CSEL xliii, 172.
[49] Ibid., iii, 7, 29. CSEL xliii, 304 ff. It is interesting that some modern critics have not appreciated this point, but have thoughtlessly and without explanation

Our judgment of his abilities as a textual critic must be considerably qualified. This is best indicated by his attitude in regard to the differences between the Septuagint and the Hebrew text of the Old Testament.

Augustine had a marked preference for the Septuagint.[50] In writing to Jerome, he criticizes the latter's translation of Job from the Hebrew and urges him instead to translate the Septuagint version. He puts this on a purely practical basis. If the translation were from the Greek, since many people are familiar with Greek, they could easily go back to the original and check the contested points. As most people are ignorant of Hebrew, they are left, in case of difficulty, without recourse.[51] There is the further practical difficulty that congregations are familiar with translations from the Greek version and resent change, whether it is justified or not. Augustine tells the famous story of the fierce outcry at Oea when Jerome's translation was read and the faithful were thrown into a turmoil at the change in the traditional text.[52]

But Augustine's objections to Jerome's "corrections" (i.e. the introduction of non-traditional readings) were based on views other than the purely practical. He believed that the Seventy enjoyed the same inspiration as the writers of the Old Testa-

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insisted on a scribal error. It is also interesting that, having elaborated this excellent argument, Augustine then goes on to produce a fantastic explanation of the text derived not from the text at all but from his understanding of God's purpose in inspiring the evangelist.

[50] De doc. christ., ii, 15, 22. PL xxxiv, 46; Epistola 28, CSEL xxxiv, pt. 1, pp. 105–7; De civ. Dei, xviii, 42–43. PL xli, 602–4.

[51] Epistola 71, CSEL xxxiv, pt. 2, p. 252.

[52] Ibid., p. 253. When Jerome replied to this letter he made the blunt statement that Augustine simply didn't understand these matters (Epistola 75, CSEL xxxiv, pt. 2, p. 318). He adds significantly that he had not labored for the purpose of *superseding* the Septuagint version, but simply of showing the Latin readers what the Hebrew text was.

Jerome's own attitude toward the Septuagint was one of change and gradual development. At first he apparently attributed all differences between the Hebrew and the Greek to scribal error and accepted the legend of inspiration without question. Later he took a more enlightened view and came finally to speak of the Seventy with very little respect. (See J. Forget, "Jérôme," Dict. de théol. cath., vol. viii, pt. 1, pp. 939–943.) Origen's attempt to reestablish a good text of the Septuagint and to provide comparisons of it with the Hebrew and with other Greek versions was not a critical effort in the modern sense, but was motivated by the desire to obtain a convenient and universally useable text (Bardy, loc. cit., p. 1496).

ment.[53] The very differences between the Hebrew and the Septuagint were therefore to be considered the result of divine purpose, and were not to be emended.[54] This being the case a "proper understanding" will show that there is no real difference between the two, but a fundamental concord (*in quibus ab Hebraica veritate putentur septuaginta interpretes discrepare . . .* BENE INTELLECTE *inveniuntur esse concordes*).[55]

Here again therefore allegory is also valid as a technique; for what can "proper understanding" have reference to other than an inner meaning? A consideration of the inner meaning of the two different textual readings will show them to be harmonious. This may be illustrated by an example: In Jonah 3:4 the Hebrew text speaks of *forty* days before Nineveh shall be overthrown; the Septuagint gives the figure as *three* days. Augustine argues that both *forty* and *three* are numbers that refer to Christ, and therefore mean the same thing.[56] And this would seem to be Augustine's final position: that the Seventy being themselves under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, deliberately altered some passages with the aim of directing the reader's attention more particularly to the spiritual sense.[57] This belief does not, it is to be noticed, eliminate the possibility of copyist's errors, faulty exemplars, bad translations, etc. in connection with other textual problems in Scripture. But it offers a way out from the difficulty that evidence on these questions, properly drawn and applied, leads to the acceptance of one answer and the rejection of all others.[58]

In summarizing the use by Augustine of the four techniques considered above, it may be stated that the following facts are clear: 1. Augustine was familiar with certain methods which

[53] De civ. Dei, xviii, 42–43. PL xli, 602–604.
[54] Ibid., xviii, 44. PL xli, 605.
[55] Ibid.
[56] Ibid.
[57] De doc. christ., iv, 7, 15. PL xxxiv, 96.
[58] It should also be mentioned that Augustine, quite aside from the possibility of escape through allegory, could not always be trusted properly to draw and apply the evidence on textual questions. His insistence in the Pelagian controversy on the reading *in quo* in Rom. 5:12 is the most notorious example of this deficiency. There in the face of all the textual evidence he adopted an indefensible position, apparently carried away by his apologetic purpose. (De peccatorum meritis et remissione, CSEL, lx, pp. 12 ff.)

he used, in some cases, in what we are justified in calling a critical manner. 2. He used them extensively for concordance purposes in the interpretation of the Bible. 3. There was an allegorical element to the methods used by Augustine such that he was not forced, in applying them, to accept an unwelcome conclusion.

The last fact requires further consideration, for on it depends any comparison with the techniques of modern critical method. The allegorical element is made clearer by asking the question, what was Augustine's conception of the meaning of the passage to which he was applying the technique? Did he have in mind meaning as established by the passage itself (whether allegorical or not), that is, the meaning intended by the writer? Or did he have in mind meaning derived from some higher source (not demonstrable from the evidence of the passage), that is, the meaning intended by God?

The answer will vary according to the specific case considered, for this is not a fifth-century but a twentieth-century question. There was no reason why Augustine should make careful distinctions to answer it; for the meaning to him was always the truth in Scripture, and the truth was always what was meant. So we find that Augustine uses the same vocabulary in both connections; to him, the concepts were not opposed.

In the following pages the dual nature of Augustine's conception of meaning will first be considered. We shall then try to decide what this means in regard to his estimate and use of critical method. Emphasis, it is evident, must fall on inner meaning as incomparably the more excellent, a fact which would seem to leave but little room for the use of worldly learning and the honest application of independent techniques. As a matter of fact, however, as will appear, the relation in Augustine's thought between worldly and sacred sciences was such that the latter could and did make a valid and definite contribution to the former. The closeness of the relationship was such that inner meaning could carry textual meaning along with it. In concluding this study we shall consider briefly the importance of the fact that an interpretive technique could be used either allegorically or not, and that in any case the conclusion was not dependent on the method.

Numerous passages can be brought forward to show that for

Augustine the aim of Biblical interpretation was nothing else than to find out what was meant by the writer, apparently in no other sense than that which could be derived from the text.[59] These passages frequently have to do with merely verbal variations between the Gospel stories. Thus, in regard to the question of what were the precise words used by John the Baptist, Augustine says that the thing to be sought is the meaning and not the exact words, for it is clear that the evangelists had the same thing in mind although they report the manner of speech with slight differences.[60] Although these cases are concerned with discrepancies that are entirely verbal, nevertheless in treating them Augustine emphasizes the importance of understanding the meaning intended by the writer, and is clearly thinking of meaning established within the limits of the evidence of the text. In these instances no question of conflict arises between meaning as established in the text and the principles of the Christian faith.

In an interesting passage in the De doctrina christiana Augustine states that those reading Scripture seek nothing else than to discover the thoughts and purpose (*cogitationes voluntatemque*) of the writers of Scripture; he then adds significantly, and through them (*per illos*) the purpose intended by God (*voluntatem Dei*) according to which they wrote.[61] The word *voluntas* in these phrases, which I have translated "purpose," clearly embraces the idea of intent. The passage shows how Augustine's two conceptions of meaning stood together. The meaning of the inspired writer and the meaning of God could never be opposed to each other. For Augustine man was predestined, but possessed at the same time a free will; in an analogous manner inner meaning absorbed but did not destroy that of the text.

This notion can be carried much further. In cases where the meaning of the writer is obscure, or in any way difficult to come at, the reader can be sure of being right by simply understanding the meaning of God in any of its infinite manifestations. What harm, asks Augustine, if you do not understand the meaning of the writer, provided that you understand the truth? [62] Any inter-

[59] Ita enim salubriter discimus nihil aliud esse quaerendum quam quid velit qui loquitur. De cons. evang., ii, 12, 29. CSEL xliii, 130.

[60] Ibid., ii, 12, 28. CSEL xliii, 129.

[61] De doc. christ., ii, 5, 6. PL xxxiv, 38.

[62] Conf., xii, 18. CSEL xxxiii, 328.

pretation that builds up the two-fold love of God and neighbor is acceptable, even though the precise meaning intended by the writer remain hid.[63] What the writer actually intended, the particular truth he had in mind, is, of course, better,[64] or, as Augustine says elsewhere,[65] more exalted than the others. But there is no objection to any number of interpretations if they are all in harmony with the truth.[66] Conversely, any interpretation that does not build up the two-fold love of God and neighbor is wrong.[67]

Augustine's conception of the meaning of a text of Scripture is, therefore, dual: meaning is, on the one hand, what the writer intended (and with this definition techniques can be applied without use of allegory and conclusions deduced from the document alone); and meaning is also, on the other hand, what God intended (and with this definition the way is opened to allegory and the limits of the text are passed).

Thus Augustine speaks of the purpose (*voluntas*) of the writer to which the words ought to be subservient (*cui debent verba servire*) [68] when he is discussing, without going beyond the evidence of the text, verbal differences between two Gospel passages. And, using exactly the same phrases, he speaks of the purpose (*voluntas*) of God to which the words ought to be subservient (*cui verba servire debent*) [69] when he is discussing the inner meaning behind textual differences between the Hebrew and the Septuagint, a matter totally beyond proof as we conceive it, and outside the limits of the document.

Augustine having this double conception of meaning, it is now our business to decide what effect that conception will have on our judgment of the validity of the techniques we have discussed. The divine or inner meaning is incomparably the more excellent

[63] De doc. christ., i, 36, 40. PL xxxiv, 34.

[64] Ibid., i, 36, 37–41. PL xxxiv, 34–35.

[65] Conf., xii, 32. CSEL xxxiii, 343–344.

[66] De doc. christ., iii, 27, 38. PL xxxiv, 80. It has sometimes been argued that Augustine taught a plurality of literal meanings in reference to Scriptural texts. The above discussion will indicate that this was not the case. The point has been elaborated by F. Talon, "Saint Augustin a-t-il réelment enseigné la pluralité des sens littéraux dans l'Ecriture?", Recherches des sciences religieuses, vol. ii (1921).

[67] De doc. christ., i, 35, 40. PL xxxiv, 34.

[68] De cons. evang., ii, 62, 121. CSEL xliii, 224.

[69] Ibid., ii, 67, 128. CSEL xliii, 230.

and important. But does it completely overshadow the meaning derived solely from the passage itself, and consequently invalidate the techniques which, as we have seen, are controlled only when applied to that kind of meaning? In other words, do these controlled techniques really lead in Augustine's own mind, to an understanding of meaning? Is there a connection for him between grammar and truth?

Augustine's statement, quoted above, to the effect that any interpretation of the Bible that does not build up the two-fold love of God and neighbor is no interpretation, seems to indicate that the emphasis is so heavily weighted on the side of inner meaning as to leave no place at all for the independent use of techniques. The rhetorical question asked in the Confessions, what profited me in my youth to have studied and understood the liberal arts and the categories of Aristotle? [70] might be taken to support this conclusion.

As a matter of fact, however, some very solid qualifications are necessary. This is fully made clear in the De doctrina christiana. In the preface to that work Augustine writes at length against those who think that they can understand Scripture by God's grace alone, without human aids.[71] He goes on in the first book to elaborate the metaphysical justification for this position. All things are good in themselves, and it is good to desire all things; but they are arranged in a careful hierarchy. Evil is defined as the disruption of this hierarchy. "Men must be taught the due measure of loving." [72] Some things are to be enjoyed, others are only to be used.[73] Judgment of any particular action or thing will depend on whether or not it corresponds properly to this natural order of things.

Within this framework, and with its limitations, specific fields of knowledge such as the knowledge of animals, minerals, plants, etc. are justified. Music, for instance, is found to be useful for the understanding of Scripture. The whole body of heathen knowledge can, in fact, be taken over, says Augustine in a famous passage, just as the Israelites despoiled Egypt.[74]

[70] Conf., iv, 16. CSEL xxxiii, 85.
[71] De doc. christ., prol., 4 ff. PL xxxiv, 17 ff.
[72] Ibid., i, 25. PL xxxiv, 28.
[73] Ibid., i, 3. PL xxxiv, 20.
[74] Ibid., ii, 40, 60. PL xxxiv, 63.

Providing a further justification for its use, Augustine divides heathen knowledge into two classes, knowledge of things instituted by men, and knowledge of things noted by men but instituted by God. The most useful categories of knowledge fall in the latter class: history, natural science, the mechanical arts and, especially, the science of reasoning.[75]

All these various branches of knowledge are not only useful but necessary. They must however be kept within the limitations imposed by the order of nature. They cannot, for Augustine, be justified when they try to accomplish more than is possible within the framework of a proper correspondence to that order. Scripture must not be bound by the rules of grammar. Solecisms and barbarisms are to be treated with indifference unless they cause ambiguity.[76]

It can therefore be stated that there is a place, albeit very limited, for the independent use of techniques in Augustine's exegetical theory. Like grammar, natural science, and the other branches of ancient learning, techniques are to be considered not only useful but necessary to the understanding of Scripture, always provided they are not extended beyond the status of tools, and the Bible is not subject to their rules. The extent to which they are, in fact, made use of will depend on the purpose of the particular interpretation at hand. Augustine divides the purposes of interpretation according to three classes of people to whom it may be directed: 1. for some a clear narrative is the important thing; 2. for others the ability to reason and exhibit proofs on difficult points is required; 3. still others need to be aroused rather than instructed.[77] This classification corresponds roughly to the Ciceronian division of the aims of rhetoric: to teach, to persuade and to delight. Naturally, the techniques in which we have been interested will be used more frequently in exegesis that is directed toward the second class of people, those who need to be persuaded and given proofs.

But reaching this conclusion, that the independent use of critical methods has the limited justification of being acceptable in its

[75] Ibid., ii, 29 ff. PL xxxiv, 56 ff.
[76] Ibid., ii, 13, 21. PL xxxiv, 45.
[77] Ibid., iv, 4, 6. PL xxxiv, 91.

place, we may now go a step further. By independently used critical methods, we understand those used in respect to the meaning of a passage as derived solely from the passage itself. These distinctions are, however, our own, which we have imposed upon Augustine. As we have seen, he did not distinguish between techniques that were used independently and those that were not, any more than he distinguished between meaning based on the evidence of the text alone and meaning based on something outside the text. We may now state the importance of the fact that he did not make these distinctions. In his mind, the critical methods we have considered have, beyond the limited justification mentioned above, the further and quite unassailable justification that they could be, and were, applied (without any change in the exercise of the technique) to the meaning of the passage in whatever sense it is defined. Because of the allegorical element Augustine could employ the techniques wholly outside the evidence of the text. Because of it he need not accept conclusions established in terms of that evidence alone. Using exactly the same methods as when investigating the demonstrable meaning of the writer, the exegete can now expound the meaning of God and leap at will from the limits of human understanding to the truths of the faith and the eternal verities, unhampered by the laws of evidence deduced from the four corners of the document.

This is the true nature of Augustine's critical techniques, and their true justification: that, because of allegory, they were useful in matters beyond evidence supplied by the text alone. And this is the reason that these techniques had a wide currency in succeeding ages. Critical method did not appear in spite of allegory; on the contrary, allegory carried critical method with it. In the generations that followed Augustine, the limited justification for the independent use of critical methods became more and more limited; some men appeared who claimed that grammar did not lead to truth, that analysis of the Bible in terms of human learning and reason did not contribute to an understanding of the meaning of the Word of God. Yet the critical methods elaborated by Augustine continued to be found in exegesis, and the critical principles behind those methods were never quite forgotten. This was only possible because of allegory, because

of the two-fold conception of meaning, because the same technique could be used on either the lower or the higher plane.

Augustine's influence and the very completeness of the dependence of medieval writers upon the Fathers brought it about that his exegetical methods were generally accepted, reproduced, and given wide currency. The Biblical commentators of the Middle Ages, of course, made even less distinction than the Bishop of Hippo between allegorical and non-allegorical techniques. But there came a time and an occasion when allegory was no longer useful as a technique. It could not be applied to the solution of apparent inconsistencies in the authorities of the canonists and theologians. Their problems were practical ones and demanded a literal solution. A figurative distinction would not settle a dispute in the courts or resolve the oppositions in the Sic et Non. And once it was no longer possible to use allegorical methods, definitions could be made of which Augustine was unaware. The meaning of a text in terms of the intent of the writer and the evidence of the text came, finally, to be the only meaning, and the development of a critical method as we understand it was possible. This development owes much to the theory and practice of Augustine's Biblical interpretation.

ΙΣΙΣ ΤΡΙΧΩΜΑΤΟΣ

In the year 1883 Bouriant copied an inscription from a stone in the parapet of the bridge at Coptus. His transcript was sent by Maspero to Miller, who presented it before the Académie des inscriptions et belles-lettres.[1] From Miller's edition it was reprinted by Cagnat in 1908[2] and by Preisigke in 1913.[3] The text is dated Pachon 23 in the eighth year of Trajan, i.e., May 18, 105 A.D., and contains the dedication Ἴσιδι τῇ χώματος.[4] A dedication to Isis of the embankment is thoroughly Egyptian and has a parallel in the much earlier trilingual stele from Tentyra, which bears a dedication to Ἴσιδι θεᾷ μεγίστῃ ἐπικαλουμένῃ Θερμούθι τῇ ἐπὶ τῷ χώματι καταντίον τοῦ δρόμου τῆς Ἀφροδίτης.[5] There must have been a fair number of chapels up and down the Nile sacred to Isis of the embankment.

Nevertheless, the tradition of a divergent text going back thirty years beyond Bouriant's transcript[6] persists through all the editions. A. C. Harris read the inscription but never published it, and the first record of his text, so far as I can discover, is the mention of it in a guide book, where only the dedication is given in Greek: Ἴσιδι τριχώματος.[7] De Ricci saw Harris's copy and transmitted this reading to Cagnat, who entered it in a note to his reprint of Miller's edition.[8] Here it was picked up by Preisigke and repeated as a note to his reprint of Cagnat's edition.[9] Miller did not take the trouble to search out Harris's text and so does not report τριχώματος as an alternative to Bouriant's τῇ χώματος. Both Cagnat and Preisigke keep Bouriant's text but have Harris's reading in a note.

[1] Miller, Rev. arch., 3ème série, 2, 1883, 177 f.

[2] IGR, 1, 1170.

[3] SB, 1, 999.

[4] The name of the dedicator has also a certain interest. Balbillus, son of Heraclides, is otherwise unknown (Arthur Stein, Aegyptus, 13, 1933, 129, n. 3). Miller, op. cit., 178, conjectures that he may be a grandson of the prefect, Tiberius Claudius Balbillus, but the increase of information about the Balbilli since Miller's day makes any such combination precarious (cf. Boak, P. Mich. 5, 312, 7–8, note).

[5] Aimé-Giron, Annales du service des antiquités de l'Égypte, 26, 1926, 152 = SEG, 8, 653 = SB, 3, 7257. The date is March 30, 12 B.C. I have omitted editorial punctuation since within the limits of the passage cited it is without critical value.

[6] Maspero in Miller, op. cit., 175: "Cette inscription a été signalée, il y a trente ans, par M. Harris, et se trouve indiquée dans le Guide Murray. Je ne me rappelle pas l'avoir vue publiée. . . ."

[7] Murray's Handbook for Travellers in Egypt, 5th ed., 1875, 392.

[8] Cagnat attributes it correctly to "Harris (in apographo nondum edito quod vidit de Ricci)."

[9] Preisigke's note has a strong methodological interest. The two persons responsible for the readings, Harris and Bouriant, are completely lost from sight: "τριχώματος nach einer Mitteilung de Riccis an Cagnat. τῇ χώματος Miller und Cagnat."

Thus, Preisigke's edition with *τῇ χώματος* in the text and *τριχώματος* in the note appeared in the first volume of his Sammelbuch in 1913, while the corresponding indexes, which were published in the second volume in 1922, list *χῶμα* but not *τρίχωμα*. Similarly, no correction was ever recorded in Preisigke's Berichtigungsliste (1922–33). And yet, in the last volume of his Wörterbuch, which was revised and published by Bilabel in 1931, this inscription is taken as evidence for *Ἴσις τριχώματος*.[10] Whether this revaluation of the readings implies a change on the part of Preisigke or should be credited to Bilabel, is impossible to say. I have failed to find any discussion of the inscription by either of these scholars. Nor does it appear that anyone has seen the stone since Bouriant's day.[11]

Fortunately, we are now able to bring to bear on this conflict of authorities a new papyrus text in the Michigan collection. P. Mich. Inv. 4683 is a letter of the second century A.D. written by a soldier[12] at Coptus to his brother, who received it at Karanis. The *προσκύνημα* formula is given a most unusual turn: *τὸ προσκύνημά σου ἀδιαλείπ[τως ποιούμε]νος παρὰ τοῖς τριχώμασι ἐν Κοπτῷ*. Elsewhere a divine name or some other obvious expression like *τοῖς ἐνθάδε θεοῖς* always follows *παρά*,[13] but here the obeissance is made "in the presence of the hair at Coptus." This is unique, but it goes a long way to confirm Harris's reading of *Ἰσιδι τριχώματος* on the stone which he saw at Coptus.[14] The curious phrase *παρὰ τοῖς τριχώμασι* means that the hair of Isis was exposed as a precious relic in the temple of *Ἴσις τριχώματος*, "Isis of the hair."

This interpretation of the inscription and the papyrus is fully confirmed by the ancient tradition.[15] It was at Coptus that Isis learned of the death of Osiris, and it was there that she cut off a lock of her hair

[10] Wörterbuch, 3, 389.

[11] Cf. Weill, Annales du service, 11, 1911, 106: "un pont en maçonnerie dans lequel on chercherait en vain les blocs antiques jadis notés par Harris, car le vieux pont a été complètement démoli et remplacé par une maçonnerie moderne en pierre et brique." The inscription is not mentioned in Petrie-Hogarth, Koptos, London, 1896.

[12] He does not so describe himself in the letter, but in lines 7–8 occurs the phrase *ἐν] τῇ στρατείᾳ*. Taken together with his presence at Coptus, this creates a solid base for the assumption that he was attached to the Roman garrison at that place. Coptus was one of the important military centers in Upper Egypt (Lesquier, L'armée rom. d'Égypte, Mém. Inst. fr. arch. or., 41, 1918, 408 f.).

[13] For numerous examples see Exler, Study in Greek Epistolography, Washington, 1923, 108–112.

[14] It would be strange if Harris had made so *difficult* a reading as *Ἰσιδι τριχώματος* without real justification on the stone, since it is a name of Isis otherwise unknown to Egyptian or Greek tradition. By comparison, Bouriant's text is *easy*.

[15] The evidence of the ancient authors is collected by Hopfner, Fontes hist. rel. aegypt., 2, 1923, 227; 3, 1923, 314; 5, 1925, 745.

in mourning.[16] The hair was at a later time on display at Coptus,[17] and the great veneration in which it was held comes to full expression in the papyrus text, where the tresses of the goddess replace the goddess herself in a *προσκύνημα* formula. In the inscription, for which we may now accept Harris's text, the goddess derives her name, *Ἶσις τριχώματος*, directly from the myth.[18]

[16] Plut., de Iside, 14. The story of the lock of Isis, as well as the more famous story of the lock of Berenice, are best understood against the anthropological background See Eitrem, Opferritus u. Voropfer, Kristiania, 1915, 344 ff.; Sommer, Haar in Religion u. Aberglauben d. Griech., Münster, 1912, 64 ff.; Schwenn, RGVV, 15, iii, 1915, 88 f.; Wilken, Rev. Coloniale Internat., 1886, ii, 225–279; 1887, i, 345–426, esp. 353–381.

[17] Etym. Mag., ed. Gaisford, 552, 12, s.v. *Κοπτός*. The lock of hair is described as *ἄπιστόν τι τριχῶν πλῆθος ὅσον ἐξ ἀνθρώπου κεφαλῆς εἰκάσαι*. At Memphis, where Isis is said to have been buried, tresses of Isis were also on exhibition (Luc., ad indoct., 14). Lucian's phrase, *ὡς . . . Μεμφῖται τῆς Ἴσιδος τοὺς πλοκάμους*, passed into a proverb (Paroemiogr. graeci, ed. Leutsch et Schneidwin, 2, 710). Cf. Lobeck, Aglaoph., 1, 52, n. l.

[18] For similar relics of Osiris see Hastings' Encyclopaedia, s.v. Relics, 652; cf. Plut., de Iside, 18. Pfister, RGVV, 5, 1909–12, is an extensive study of relics in the Greek world.

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